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CYBER COMMODIFICATION 
Miriam A. Cherry*
INTRODUCTION 
Last year, the Huffington Post weblog found itself involved in a 
contentious legal dispute with its unpaid bloggers about the 
commodification of its content.1  The Huffington Post features many posts 
that are straight-ahead news reports; other posts have featured more 
ideological content aimed at a liberal audience.  Leading up to the 2008 
election, many Huffington Post bloggers wrote accounts critical of then-
President George W. Bush, specifically his administration‘s treatment of 
the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, while others wrote to assist fellow 
Democratic voters become more familiar with the primary candidates. 2
Regardless of one‘s personal political leanings, what is certain is that the 
website attracted a sophisticated level of writing in its posts.  Featured 
bloggers included professional journalists and attorneys who contributed 
their efforts to the Huffington Post for free, despite normally being paid 
for their writing.  Freshly updated content helped attract an additional 
audience to the blog, which grew rapidly, reaching 15 million hits per 
weekday.3
In March 2011 media giant AOL submitted a $315 million 
acquisition bid for the Huffington Post. 4  The web traffic that was driven 
to the HuffPo website was valuable to AOL, a company that had been 
searching both for more content providers and an expanded audience for 
existing content.  Arianna Huffington and her financial backers stood to 
make a handsome profit from the acquisition.  The bloggers, on the other 
hand, who had built the blog‘s readership by dint of their hard work, were 
to receive nothing.5    Frustrated, Jonathan Tasini, a journalist and labor 
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1 See Paul Farhi, Freelancer to File Class-Action Suit Against HuffPo and AOL Over Compensation, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 12, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifesytle/style/freelancer-to-file-
class-action-suit-aainst-huffpost-and-aol-over-compensation/2011/04/12/AFa9QGQD_story.html.  
2See e.g.  Shayana Kadidal, Guantanamo, Six Years Later,  HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2008)  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/guantanamo-six-years-late_b_81025.html;  For the Huffington 
Post‘s current stance on this issue, see Ben Fox, Guantanamo Closure Hopes Fade as Prison Turns Ten,  
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 10, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/10/guantanamo-closure-
anniversary_n_1195984.html.  
3 Nate Silver, The Economics of Blogging and the Huffington Post,  NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 12, 2011, 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/the-economics-of-blogging-and-the-huffington-post/
(estimating 15 million page hits per weekday on HuffPo and analyzing types of posts and attention they 
typically were attracting).
4 Id.; see also Julianne Pepitone, Huffington Post blogger sues AOL for $105 million,  CNNMONEY.COM,
Apr. 12, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/12/technology/huffington_post_blogger_lawsuit/index.htm.
5 Jeff Berovici, AOL, Arianna Huffington Hit with Class Action Suit, FORBES.COM, Apr. 12, 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/04/12/aol-arianna-huffington-hit-with-class-action-suit/.  See 
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activist,6 along with other unpaid bloggers, filed a lawsuit challenging the 
terms of the deal. 7  The bloggers claimed that as their hard work had built 
the blog‘s value, they therefore deserved a share of the profits, either 
through a contract claim or a claim for unjust enrichment and restitution. 8
The heart of the Huffington Post bloggers‘ claims seemed to rest,  
as many contract disputes do, in the differing expectations that the parties 
brought with them to the deal.   From the bloggers‘ perspective,  they 
performed work without payment because they believed that they were 
contributing to a political website that advanced the causes in which they 
believed.  Retroactively, they learned that the founders were to profit 
from the blog, and they therefore felt taken advantage. 9  On the other 
hand, the Huffington Post contended that the bloggers undertook their 
writing with no expectation of compensation.  Further, they claimed that 
the bloggers did receive a substantial benefit,  as they used the HuffPo ―to 
connect and help their work be seen by as many people as possible.  It‘s 
the same reason people go on TV shows: to promote their views and 
ideas.‖10  In other words, according to the HuffPo, the blog provided 
unknown writers with an important boon: a platform for expression and 
free publicity to a growing audience. 11  On March 30, 2012, the district 
court sided with the HuffPo blog and dismissed the bloggers‘ complaint. 12
The decision is now being appealed [Check with court].    
While the Huffington Post dispute is a new context for examining 
the monetization of Internet websites and online activities, the fact,  
however, is that this question – whether a website is or should be 
commercialized – is becoming an increasingly common and vexing one.  
For in the past decade, technology has fundamentally shaped and 
restructured the ways in which many markets function. 13  Indeed, certain 
also Tim Rutten, AOL? HuffPo.  The Loser? Journalism, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2011,  
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/09/opinion/la-oe-rutten-column-huffington-aol-20110209 (―To grasp its 
business model… you need to picture a galley rowed by slaves and commanded by pirates.‖).
6 Jonathan Tasini was previous the successful lead plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the rights of 
newspapers to license the work of freelance writers to electronic databases without additional compensation.  
See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (ruling in favor of freelance writers).  
7 See Tasini v. AOL Inc., Class Action Complaint, 11 CV 2472 (April 12, 2011) (S.D.N.Y.).  
8 The claim would be that, although a formal contract was lacking, the organizers of the Huffington Post 
were unjustly enriched and a restitution theory would be applied to compensate the bloggers.  Do Huffington 
Post Bloggers Deserve to Get Paid?,  LAW BLOG, WSJ.COM, (Apr. 12, 2011, 4:01 PM) 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/04/12/should-huffington-post-bloggers-get-paid/tab/print/. 
9 The unpaid bloggers posted on the Twitter account #huffpuff, claiming that the HuffPo ―built a blog-
empire on the backs of thousands of citizen journalists.‖  Ironically, liberal ideology generally tends to support 
organized labor and worker‘s rights. 
10 Jeremy W. Peters, Huffington Post Is Target of Suit on Behalf of Bloggers,  NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 12, 
2011, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/huffington-post-is-target-of-suit-on-behalf-of-
bloggers/?pagemode= print. 
11 Id.  For academic commentary discussing the rise of amateurism and peer production of webblogs, see, 
e.g.  John Quiggen & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 203, 220 
(2008). 
12 Tasini v. AOL, __ F.Supp.2d__, 2012 WL 1066893 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
13 For example, computerized trades have replaced the loud, frantic atmosphere of the ―trading pit‖ where 
stockbrokers traditionally executed buy-sell orders.  See, e.g.  Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money, 
Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02speed.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=trading+floor+electronic&st=nyt; 
Michael J. De La Merced & Jack Ewing, A German Bid to Take Over the Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EFDC1E30F933A25751C0A9679D8B63&scp=2&sq=tradi
ng+floor+electronic&st=nyt.  See also Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J. L. & COM. 
509, 509 (1996) (prescient article noting ―the way we think about property is changing in light of the 
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goods and services, which in the past were off-limits because they would 
have been impracticable to sell or difficult to buy, have been brought to 
market by intermediaries such as eBay, 14 Amazon.com,15 and Craigslist, 16
as these platforms17 have either minimized or removed various transaction 
costs.  Further, items that have traditionally been seen as non-
monetizable, such as predictions about future events, 18 tasks performed in 
minutes or even seconds of leisure time,19 or the friendship and 
connections that comprise social capital, 20 are all now rapidly in the 
process of being valued, monetized, globalized,21 and marketed online.   
At times these shifting boundaries have resulted in legal disputes.   
When it comes to commodification on the Internet, it is a wild, 
wild World Wide Web.  Researching encyclopedia articles for Wikipedia 
is an unpaid labor of love, but connecting to your friends on Facebook is 
a $100 billion enterprise. 22  Newspaper classified advertisements are 
definitely commercial, but their equivalent on Craigslist was mostly non-
commercial – until the Delaware Chancery Court stepped in. 23  Selling 
your organs is prohibited in the United States, whereas selling hair 
technological and social realities of the global flow of digital information over linked computer networks.‖).  See 
also M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology Scholarship,  114 
PENN STATE L. REV. 809 (2010) (describing psychological literature on how humans are interacting with 
robotic devices, such as global mapping programs and roomba housekeepers).  
14 EBAY (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.ebay.com.  As one of the first online auction websites, eBay has 
certainly had its share of commodification controversies.  In 1999, the attempted auction of a human kidney on 
eBay created a furor and spurred further debate surrounding markets in human organs.  See Amy Harmon, 
Auction for a Kidney Pops Up on eBay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13.  Citing federal law 
criminalizing organ sales, see National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 274e (2007), eBay removed 
the auction, but not before bids had reached several million dollars.  Since that time, eBay has attracted more 
than its share of non-traditional sale items, including ―holy toast,‖ a grilled cheese sandwich with a grill pattern 
that reflected the likeness of the Virgin Mary, occult items, and even people putting themselves up for sale.  
$28,000 Bid Wins Sandwich,  CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2004, at 18; “Virgin Mary” Sandwich Sells on eBay for 
$28,000: Online Casino Gobbles Up Grilled Cheese Icon, CNN.COM, Nov. 23, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/11/23/ebay.sandwich.ap/index.html; See Mary Ann Georgantopolous, Student’s 
eBay Stint Pays the Bills, Makes a Friend,  BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2007, at 4 (describing vacationing student 
who sold himself – or at least one week of his labor – in order to pay for an airline ticket back to the United 
States).  Which goods and services are considered legitimately for sale, which are jokes, and which are banned 
is a seemingly delicate and ever-shifting line implicating issues of public policy, morality, and the doctrines of 
common law contracts. As new markets form and transaction costs continue to fall, the boundaries between 
market and non-market activity are prone to increased slippage.  So while it is legally acceptable for one to sell 
the space on his or her forehead to sport a tattoo with the name of a corporation, the literal sale of one‘s soul is 
forbidden on Internet auction sites.  See Andrew Adam Newman, The Body as Billboard: Your Ad Here,  N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at B3; Soul Seller, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2004, at 49 (describing auction for a soul that 
slipped past eBay‘s rules; price of a soul in that auction was mere $400).
15 AMAZON (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.amazon.com.   
16 CRAIG‘S LIST (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.craigslist.com. 
17 I use this term throughout the article even though it has many meanings – a technical platform, a 
platform from which to speak, or in the words of one commentator, platforms as the ―curators of public 
discourse.‖ See Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of “Platforms,” NEW MEDIA & SOCIETY (2010); Niva Elkin-
Koren, User-Generated Platforms, WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, DIANE L. ZIMMERMAN & HARRY FIRST, EDS.) (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1648465.
18 See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY (2008) (describing the benefits of prediction 
markets).  For the author‘s discussion of the legal issues surrounding prediction markets, see Miriam A. 
Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment,  2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (2008); 
Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information Markets to Predict 
Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2006); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Markets 
for Markets: Origins and Subjects of Information Markets,  58 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (2006).
19 Randall Stross, When the Assembly Line Moves Online,  N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at 5. 
20 See infra,  note __ and accompanying text. 
21 See, e.g.  Miriam A. Cherry,  The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 471 
(2010) (noting increasing trend toward globalization in online work).  
22 See Section III(B), infra. 
23 See Section III(A), infra. 
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promises to rescue third-world citizens from poverty. 24  Selling sex is 
illegal as prostitution, but selling adultery online is a hot new business 
model.25  And a small company offering a free service to academics has 
quietly become the dominant method for disseminating academic legal 
research, quietly beating massive commercial data providers without 
anyone initially noticing.26  This Article explores these and other recent 
developments to explore the challenging legal issues raised by Internet 
commodification of what is often unpaid labor.  
The new technology that has given rise to these unconventional 
markets raises provocative legal and theoretical questions.  As productive 
collaborative uses of the Internet continue to develop, how are the lines 
between monetized and free goods and services being drawn in 
cyberspace, and how is technology working to shape or change existing 
norms about what is and what is not commodified?  As new technologies 
are being created, disputes arise about how and when marketization could 
or should occur.   Money can attract participation in ways that purely fun 
activities might not be able to, and provide important incentives for 
engaging users.   On the other hand, the Internet has at its ethos an ―open 
access‖ ethic27 that has led to many useful free innovations, with examples 
that are as wide-ranging as the development of Linux to free mapping 
programs and Wikipedia.28
It is often difficult to analyze change when it is unfolding and one is 
living through it.   Much of our current body of contract law doctrine 
traces its origins to the rise of mass production and expansion of factory 
labor three hundred years ago.29  The changes in information technology 
and commerce that are now taking place are equally as complex and 
dramatic as the innovations during the original Industrial Revolution.30
Accompanying advances in communication and information technology is 
a dramatic expansion of online trade and commerce.    As such, it is 
important to think of contract law‘s place in this new world of networked 
trade and commerce.  This Article identifies current developments and 
analyzes what types of legal issues these developments may pose for the 
future.  Some well-established doctrines of contract law may help in 
resolving disputes in this diverse wild-web world.   
This Article makes a unique contribution to the theoretical work 
surrounding commodification.  In The Wealth of Networks,  Professor 
24 See Section I, infra. 
25 See Section II, infra. 
26 See Section IV(B), infra.  
27 For example, see GOOGLE MAPS (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.googlemaps.com; & MAPQUEST (Mar. 
2, 2012) http://www.mapquest.com. 
28 WIKIPEDIA.ORG (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.wikipedia.org.  
29 For example, the doctrine on the forseeability of contract damages comes to us from the case Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 16 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).  As noted by Professor Richard Danzig, the case was part of 
a sea change in commerce that came along with the advent of mass production.  See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. 
Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law,  4 J. LEG. STUD. 249, 252 (1975).   
30 One contemporary of the English Industrial Revolution wrote the following in describing the changes 
and the effect that had on the law of commerce: ―What our Law was then [before the Industrial Revolution], it 
is not now; and what is now, can best be understood by seeing what it was, then.  It is like the comparison 
between England under former, and present, systems of transit, for persons, property, and intelligence: 
between the days of lumbering wagons, stage coaches, and a creeping post – and of swift, luxurious railroads 
and lightening telegraphs.  All is altered: material, inducing corresponding moral and social changes.‖ S.
WARREN, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW STUDIES 12 (3d ed. 1863).  
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Yochai Benkler extols the virtues of free collaboration in cyberspace, via 
what he describes as open-source or ―commons-based peer 
preoduction.‖31  Professor Margaret Radin also expresses skepticism about 
markets in relation to unconventional markets.   On a first examination, 
choices about commodification seem binary – an on or off switch – and as 
such they are in fundamental tension.  With a deeper examination, 
however, I believe this is a false dichotomy.  Commodication is more of a 
continuum, with many portions of the Internet existing in states of what 
Radin might term ―incomplete commodification.‖32 While Professors 
Benkler and Radin are skeptical of marketization of the Internet,  that 
skepticism is, in my view, mostly unjustified.  There is nothing about the 
Internet that inherently means that it must be free.  In fact, it is my 
contention that contests and disputes arise not because of commodification 
itself but because of misunderstandings about the degree of 
commodification surrounding a particular transaction.  With the 
appropriate qualifications and limits that will be pointed out throughout 
the Article, monetization need not be as problematic, as these two 
scholars seem to assume. 
Keeping this thesis in mind, while scholars have provided narrow 
telescopic glimpses into isolated components of cyber commodification, 
this piece aims to catalogue and describe these issues further.  At the 
outset, I note that cyber commodification is a multivalent concept that 
does not lend itself to easy analysis or description.  The term cyber 
commodification as I employ it refers to a number of ideas, including 
creating new markets for goods or services on the Internet that have not 
existed before; monetizing items that we would not normally think of as 
financial concepts, such as friendship, or two seconds of someone‘s time, 
or someone‘s individual predictions about the future; creating business 
models that attempt to harness what would traditionally be unpaid labor 
and what commentators have referred to as ―peer production‖; or 
leveraging or arbitraging the differing values of goods or services based 
on the absence of geographic boundaries on the Internet.   As this is a 
complex and new phenomenon, the rest of this Article seeks to provide a 
rough exploratory map of this new terrain.   
In order to map the concept of cyber commodification more fully,  
the rest of this paper is structured as a systematic analysis of the concept 
31 See, e.g.  YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 9 (2006) (―As collaboration among far-flung 
individuals becomes more common, the idea of doing things that require cooperation with others becomes much 
more attainable, and the range of projects individuals can choose as their own therefore qualitatively increases.  
The very fluidity and low commitment required of any given cooperative relationship increases the range and 
diversity of cooperative relations people can enter, and therefore of collaborative projects they can conceive of 
as open to them.‖).  See also Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer 
Production,  11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963 (2009).   
32 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,  100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); see also Margaret Jane 
Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction, The Subject and Object of Commodification,  RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION  25 (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS EDS., 2005) (Radin is ―convinced that [her] most 
useful scholarly contribution is likely to be having made the word ‗commodification‘ speakable in legal academic 
discourse.‖). Indeed, as early as 2002, Professor Margaret Jane Radin, a pioneer of commodification theory in 
legal literature, noted that the Internet and other computer technology was helping to accelerate various types of 
commodification by lowering transaction costs and bringing buyers and sellers together in a truly global 
marketplace.  Margaret Jane Radin, Incomplete Commodification in the Computerized World, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 4 (NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL EDS., 2002).  
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in five parts, using both illustrative examples and broader theoretical 
material.  Part One explains how cyber commodification is different from 
earlier forms of commodification that are more familiar to us.  As such it 
seeks insights from the first wave of commodification theory that grew out 
of advances in medical technology that enabled us to think about 
reproduction, organ sales, and other biologic components associated with 
the body in market terms.  From this more historical and theoretical 
background, Part Two discusses the forces that have propelled cyber 
commodification.  These forces include anonymity, the elimination of 
geographical barriers, and the lack of jurisdictional guidelines that apply 
to the Internet.  While the examples in this section range all the way from 
an online market for adultery to Chinese ―goldfarmers‖ who play video 
game characters for a living, what they all share in common is that they 
explain why the cyber commodification phenomenon has become 
ubiquitous.  In Part Three, I discuss the process of cyber 
commodification, using the business model of craigslist as an illustrative 
example as well as examining prediction markets, which monetize 
knowledge and information.  Part Four moves on to contests and disputes
that have arise from differing expectations that parties bring with them 
into various transactions.  Finally, in Part Five, I discuss the greater 
implications of cyber commodification, including its various associated 
costs and benefits.  
I. Differentiating Cyber Commodification 
Previously, scholars have studied and analyzed commodification of 
goods and services, with a great deal of attention focusing on non-
traditional or controversial markets, such as markets in surrogacy or the 
sale of organs or body parts.  Some of these unconventional categories 
push the boundaries of what most in our society would consider off-limits 
or problematic.  In the literature unconventional markets are thus oft-
referred to as ―taboo trades,‖ ―repugnant markets,‖ 33 or, humorously,  
―ick-onomics.‖34 While these matters have been at least partially analyzed 
by courts and academic commentators, the markers between monetized 
and non-monetized transactions are still being clarified.  Indeed, it is 
important to realize that these delineations are often contextually and 
culturally dependent.  For example, payment for organs is forbidden in 
the United States, but is permitted in Iran;35 markets in fossils are 
outlawed in many European countries, but they thrive in the lightly 
regulated market of the United States. 36  So, what can we learn from these 
examples for our present purposes of exploring cyber commodification?  
33 Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (Summer 2007). 
34 Id. 
35 Alex Tabarrok, The Meat Market,  WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2010, at A1; Alex Altman & Claire Suddath, 
How does Kidney-Trafficking Work?,  TIME.COM, July 27, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1912880,00.html.  
36 Miriam A. Cherry, A Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named “Sue”: Using a Disputed Dinosaur to Teach 
Contract Defenses,  82 N.D. L. REV. 295 (2005) (describing lightly regulated fossil markets in the United 
States).
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Further, what are the differences between these offline commodification 
concerns and what is happening now online?  Specifically, how have 
markets responded to previous technological changes?  How did the law 
play a role in the creation or inhibition of the markets?  In order to 
examine these questions, a brief general background of the legal 
doctrines, and then a short literature review is helpful.   
A.  Existing Legal Framework for Regulation of New Markets 
As a broad overview, U.S. federal and state laws police the border 
of marketable goods and services.  On the first order are constitutional 
provisions, such as the Thirteenth Amendment, 37 and statutes that 
criminalize, forbid, or otherwise ban markets in a particular good or 
service.  These provisions are sometimes dependent on context, and may 
shift over time along with the changing morals of the day.  In addition, 
many statutes set the ground rules for participation in markets or attempt 
to protect vulnerable participants,38 although these statutes are more about 
regulation than forbidding particular market activity.  Finally, other 
common law legal doctrines, such as public policy, consideration, and the 
concept of inalienability in property law operate within common law to 
establish the line between permissible market versus non-market activity.39
Constitutional provisions or criminal statutes can put certain activities 
off-limits for exchange in a market. 40  Constitutional provisions can be 
used to outlaw an entire market for a good entirely, such as was the case 
with the prohibition of alcohol.41  Criminal statutes may also be written in 
such a way that make an entire market illegal; or it may be context 
dependent.   For example, many drugs that once were legal, such as 
cocaine, are now banned. 42  But other banned drugs, specifically 
marijuana, are permissible with the presence of particular medical 
conditions in certain states.43  Sexual activity, which would otherwise be 
legal is criminalized if it involves the exchange of money.44  And Federal 
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal 
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011). 
38 See generally Joel Seligman, The Changing Nature of Securities Regulation,  6 WASH. U. J. J. L. &
PUB. Pol‘y 205 (2001). 
39 Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability,  100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
40 See, e.g. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Ensnared, WALL ST. J., 
July 23-24, 2011, at A1 (describing father and son who were arrested for digging arrowheads on federal land). 
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI) (instituting prohibition along with 
the Volstead Act).  See also Susan Lorde Martin, Wine Wars – Direct Shipment of Wine: The Twenty-First 
Amendment, The Commerce Clause, and Consumers’ Rights, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2000); Lloyd C. Anderson, 
Direct Shipment of Wine, The Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative 
Reform,  27 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2004).
42 See, e.g.  NICK REDING, METHLAND THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN SMALL TOWN (2010). 
43 See, e.g.  Michael Berkey, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL‘Y & ETHICS J. 417 (2011).  
44 Anti-prostitution laws criminalize the payment of money for sexual services.  However, this rule is also 
context-dependent and produces odd results in its application at times.  While payment for sexual services is 
banned in prostitution, producers of pornography legally pay performers for their appearance in sexually 
explicit films, which include payment for sexual services.  See Taylor v. State, 167 Ariz. 429, 808 P.2d 314 
(Ariz.Ct.App. 1990).  See also Andrew Gilden, Sexual (Re)Consideration: Adult Entertainment Contracts and 
the Problem of Encforceabillity,  96 GEO. L. J. 541 (2007).  Recently, Prof. SpearIt Maldonado has argued that 
the justification for the distinction between prostitution and pornography is a flimsy one, since both constitute 
the commodification of sexual services.  As such, the criminalization of prostitution treats those in like 
situations unequally, in fact criminalizing the activity for those of lower socio-economic class. SpearIt 
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anti-gambling laws have recently been strengthened as a reaction to the 
growth of Internet gambling.45
In other instances, state or federal statutes do not prevent a market 
from existing or activity from taking place,  but instead they regulate who 
may participate in the market or otherwise prescribe rules to which market 
participans must adhere.  At times the regulation largely replicates the 
role of custom46 but in other instances regulations exist for advancing 
consumer or investor protection.  Examples of such statutes include the 
Magnuson-Moss Act,47 which governs the form and structure of 
warranties provided for consumer goods, or the rules regarding accredited 
investors under the Securities and Exchange Act. 48
Even when there is no applicable statute explicitly criminalizing or 
regulating a market, the common law doctrines of consideration and 
public policy may play a role in market regulation.  The touchstone of 
contract law is the bargained-for-exchange, the reciprocal inducement of 
consideration as described by Oliver Wendell Holmes. 49  Long the bane of 
first-year law students, the doctrine is littered with moral commitments,50
and promises to make charitable donations.51  While not often litigated,52
the doctrine of consideration performs an important policing function in 
terms of decisions about what kinds of trades will be enforceable, and thus 
legitimately part of a market economy, and those trades that are 
unenforceable.  Public policy is another ill-defined doctrine,53 but it too 
has formed the basis for striking down particular private bargains. 54  From 
this broad legal overview, I turn now to a literature review of 
commodification theory. 
B.  Scholarly Analysis of Commodification 
In the last two decades, legal scholarship has tried to theorize coherent 
doctrinal approaches to the regulation of markets in human tissues and 
organs,55 sex,56 surrogate pregnancy,57 and even the online sale of 
Maldonado, Pornography and Prostitution (unpublished draft on file with author). 
45 Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment,  2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 833 (2008).
46 Indeed, one commentator has noted that certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act inscribed into law 
the ―best practices‖ that existed at the time.  See, e.g. Lawrence Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy 
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).  
47 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 106(b), 88 Stat. 2183, 
(1974) (codified as amended at  15 U.S.C. § 2306 (2006)).  
48 Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2006); Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. 
Partnerships Securities Litigation, 815 F.Supp 620, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the purpose of the 
Securities and Exchange Act in exempting those who qualify as accredited investors is to facilitate specially 
designed offerings while also protecting against the danger posed by the lack of SEC scrutiny of offer and sale).  
49 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (MARK DEWOLFE HOWE ED., BELKNAP PRESS OF 
HARVARD UNIV. PRESS 1963) (1881). 
50 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).  
51 Johnson v. Otterbein Univ., 41 Ohio St. 527 (Oh. 1885). 
52 Among practitioners, the doctrine of consideration would generally be considered a ―deadletter‖ since 
consideration is present in almost all commercial deals with which a transactional attorney would have to deal.  
53 Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Penn. Comm. Pleas 1957).  
54 Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1987);  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 179 
(1981). 
55 See, e.g.  Michele Goodwin, Empires of the Flesh: Tissue and Organ Taboos,  60 ALA. L. REV. 1219, 
1221-22 (2009) (arguing for compensation to family members to increase organ supply rather than modifying 
default rules of donation); Lisa Milot, What are We – Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment 
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virginity.58  Over thirty years ago, Elisabeth M. Landes and Richard 
Posner sparked widespread controversy when they began writing about 
the creation of markets for child adoption.59  Proposals surrounding 
markets for human organs have also sparked serious debate.60
Feminist theorists have been at the forefront of this commodification 
discussion, perhaps because some of these markets have gender 
implications, concern the body, or concern women‘s traditional roles, 
which were historically outside and apart from paid labor markets. 61
Many of these theorists were concerned with the dignitary aspects of these 
trades, and argued that women‘s bodies and reproductive capacities should 
not the subject of trade or market pressures.   Other feminists were 
concerned about the exploitation of poor women by the wealthy, 
sometimes based on racial lines or based on development status of the 
countries in which women lived.  Some were concerned that the 
monetization of reproductive capacity could only lead to further 
exploitation.     
Although there are a number of conflicting discussions and 
assumptions surrounding the development of commodification of the 
body, opponents of commodification in these areas voice arguments that 
touch on two general areas of concern.  First,  there is a concern that 
markets can be coercive and play on the desperation that arises from 
abject poverty and economic inequality. 62  Second, opponents argue that 
commodification will corrupt basic human values, meaning that ―certain 
moral and civic goods are diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for 
money.‖63  In other words, particular markets might impair the value of 
human life and, perhaps, dignity.  While the first argument looks to the 
ideal of consent,  the dignity argument examines the type of goods on offer 
and questions whether the purchase and sale of those goods will produce 
good results for society overall. 64
Other feminist theorists, including Professors Katharine Silbaugh65 and 
of Transfers of Human Body Materials,  67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2010) (proposing tax reforms to 
address various types of transactions in body materials).  In her work The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks,  
author Rebecca Skloot invites the reader to contemplate some of the questions involved with the 
commercialization of human tissues.  See generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA 
LACKS (2010). 
56MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) 132. 
57 See, e.g.,  Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M,  30 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 67 (2007).   
58 Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth,  88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1739-40 (2010) (recounting story of 
2008 virginity auction at Moonlite Bunny Ranch in Nevada).  
59 See, e.g.  Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage,  7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 323 (1978); RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).  The secondary literature that has developed in 
response to this provocative argument has been extensive.  See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and 
Intermediation in the Market for Babies,  66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009) (collecting sources). 
60 See Roth, supra note 32.  See also Emily C. Lee, Trading Kidneys for Prison Time: When Two 
Contradictory Legal Traditions Intersect, Which One has the Right-Of-Way?, 43 U.S.F.L REV. 507, 508 
(2009) (describing proposed bill in South Carolina that would have provided good time credit for prisoners who 
became kidney donors, S.B. 480, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C.2007)).  
61 RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOHN C. WILLIAMS, EDS. 2005). 
62 Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy, The Moral Limits of Markets,  RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION  122 (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS EDS., 2005).  
63 Id.  at 124. 
64 Id.
65 Martha Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/ Private Distinction,  36 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
REV. 79 (2001). 
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Martha Ertman66 have argued in favor of commodification more generally,  
proposing that familial relations would be more equitable if they were to 
be viewed in monetized terms.  Indeed, Professor Kimberly Krawiec has 
advocated for the monetization of certain of these taboo trades, arguing 
that legalization and monetization of the sexual economy could lead to 
women‘s empowerment and more full participation in the market 
economy.67
While these various arguments in favor or against commodification of 
the body resound in arguments based on either equality or autonomy, 
Professor Joan Williams notes that perhaps this is a false dichotomy.68
Rather than a fully market transaction or a wholly non-commodified one, 
Williams suggests that all transactions fall on some part of a continuum, 
which she terms ―differentiated ties.‖ 69  Some amount of commodification 
of our private lives is inevitable, according to Williams, and rather than 
focus on judging whether this is appropriate or not, she asks several key 
questions.  Williams exhorts us to be concerned with whether the end 
result of the commodification is liberating, who controls the process of 
marketing and receives the proceeds, and whether the commodification 
advances or harms social ties.70 While ―differentiated ties‖ is an awkward 
terminology that does not seem to capture fully Williams‘ concept, the 
questions she poses are important, and I will return to these insights in the 
last portion of the Article.        
How does the further development of Internet technology have an 
impact on some of these unconventional markets?  What is marketable has 
always been contextually and culturally dependent, and has been subject to 
change over time, apart from any changes in the technological 
mechanisms for market exchange.  But particular aspects of this new 
technology have their own dynamic that seem to encourage 
commodification.    Would even Landes and Posner have predicted an 
online market for human hair?71  In dealing with sales that concern the 
body, the Internet seems to reduce transaction costs.  These reduced 
transaction costs can take the form of an intermediary website acting as 
platform.  The legitimacy and acceptability that such an intermediary 
conveys may encourage particular types of transactions to become 
commodified, and perhaps seem more acceptable.  To ask the converse 
question, however, how does the theory surrounding the first generation 
66  Katherine Silbaugh, Marriage contracts and the Family Economy,  93 NW. U.L. REV. 65 (1998). 
67 Krawiec, supra note 57 at 1768-69. 
68 Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify That Is Not the Question, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION  368 (MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN C. WILLIAMS EDS., 2005).  
69 Id.    
70 Id.  at 375-77. 
71 On BuyandSellHair.com, sellers can create listings for their hair, including color and length.  See 
Listings for Hair for Sale,  BUYANDSELLHAIR,COM, http://buyandsellhair.com/ad-category/hair-for-sale/ (last 
visited, Mar. 2, 2012).  While in developed countries this may not be big business, in developing countries the 
sale of hair can forestall abject poverty.  For example, in Eastern Europe, some children sell their hair for 
$3.20 to buy food, and the hair is then sold in the United Kingdom and the United States for thousands of 
dollars.  See Eddie Fitzmaurice, Children Sell Their Hair for $3,  THE SUN-HERALD, Feb 22, 2004.  On the 
other end of the spectrum, many choose to make donations of their hair, through organizations such as Locks 
of Love, to those who need it due to various illnesses or chemotherapy.  Mission & Vision,  LOCKS OF LOVE, 
http://www.locksoflove.org/mission.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  Note that wigs are not covered by most 
health insurance plans, as they are considered cosmetic.
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of commodification analyses have applicability for the questions of 
Internet commodification?  Let us to turn to some examples that illustrate 
the forces pushing toward cyber commodification, and we will return to 
the theoretical matters when discussing the implications of cyber 
commodification in the last portion of the Article.  
II. Forces Propelling Cyber Commodification 
Several exogenous forces have made cyber commodification 
increasingly prevalent.   These forces are directly related to several 
distinctive traits of the very Internet itself – the ability for market 
participants to maintain anonymity, reduction in transaction costs, the 
increasing irrelevance of geography and even national borders, and the 
lack of clear jurisdictional boundaries.  These forces can best be described 
through accompanying illustrative examples.  For anonymity, this 
discussion takes the form of an online market for adultery and child 
naming.  For transaction costs and the decreasing relevance of geography, 
I discuss virtual work and a new method of financing start-up businesses 
known as crowdfunding.   
A.   Anonymity 
Anonymity encourages the growth of cyber commodification.  
According to a recent article, ―[a]nonymity and pseudonymity are intrinsic 
to, and inseparable from, cyberspace, because a computer serves as a 
medium through which interaction is facilitated . . . [T]he identity of each 
individual is removed either completely or in part.‖72  Both the concepts of 
anonymity and deindividuation have been used as frameworks to analyze 
the proliferation of various types of conduct in cyberspace including 
defamation,73 software piracy,74 gambling,75 and harassment and cyber-
bullying.76
Numerous studies indicate that people behave differently when they 
believe their identity is anonymous.77  However, the role anonymity plays in 
72 Sameer Hinduja, Deindividuation and Internet Software Privacy, 11 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 391, 
392 (2008). 
73 Rowland, supra note 54. 
74 Hinduja, supra note 71.  
75 Mark Griffiths et al., Internet Gambling: An Overview of Psychosocial Impacts, 10 UNLV GAMBLING &
RES. J. 27 (2006). 
76 Daniel Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Warren Chik, Harrassment Through 
the Digital Medium A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparative Analysis on the Law of Cyberstalking, 3 J. OF INT‘L COM.
L. & TECH. 13 (2008); Cf. Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 113 (describing ways in which negative terms 
can be searched).   
77 See e.g. Katherine S. Williams, On-Line Anonymity, Deindividuation and Freedom of Expression and 
Privacy, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 687, 691 (2006) (citing GUSTAV LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR 
MIND (Transaction Publishers 1995) (1895)); M.E. Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace: 
Deindividuation, Incivility and Lawlessness Versus Freedom and Privacy at the Annual Conference of the 
European Institute for Computer Anti-virus Research (Mar. 16, 1998) available at
http://www.mekabay.com/overviews/anonpseudo.pdf, (citing Phillip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: 
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a person‘s decision-making is subject to debate.  One predominant theory78
within the psychological literature is deindividuation, ―or the state of 
alienation, reduced inhibition, and lack of self-awareness which occurs 
when a personal sense of identity is overwhelmed by that of the group.‖79
Early research focused on an individual losing self-awareness due to 
participation in a large group.80  However, even absent group membership, 
anonymity may be a contributing factor to deindividuation because 
anonymity results in a lack of self-awareness.81  This resulting lack of self-
awareness can lead to disinhibited or anti-normative behavior.82  For 
example, from the relative anonymity of his or her car, a driver is more 
likely to exhibit road rage,83 a participant in an experiment is more likely to 
deliver a higher voltage of electric shock to his co-participant if his face is 
concealed,84 and anonymous students are more likely to write cruel 
comments about instructors in their teaching evaluations.85
 Evidence supporting a causal link between anonymity and certain 
behavior on the Internet is lacking, but several otherwise important 
observations regarding anonymity and Internet behavior exist.  For instance, 
anonymity is rationally chosen by people who do not want to be held 
accountable for their decision making.86  Anonymity allows individuals to 
engage in a behavior without the fear of stigma associated with that 
behavior.87  Further, individuals may act online without receiving 
disapproval or judgment.88  Most importantly, computer-mediated 
Individuation, Reason and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON 
MOTIVATION (W.J. Arnold & D. Levine, eds., University of Nebraska Press (Lincoln) 1969)).   
78 Social Identity Theory of Deindividuation (SIDE) is particularly relevant in the Internet context.  SIDE 
divides the self into two subgroups: (1) personal - - the qualities that make an individual different from others; and 
(2) social - - the groups the individual belongs to and the identity of that person within the groups.  Williams, 
supra note 54, at 693.  Deindividuation results when an individual abandons the personal identity for the social 
identity and the norms and frames or reference from different groups.  Williams supra note 54, at 693.  While 
anonymity may not cause anti-normative behavior, it can facilitate acting on an impulse or lower inhibitions 
which allows a person to behave in a way she would not if not anonymous.  John Suler, The Online Disinhibition 
Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321, 322 (2004).  Most likely, anonymity is simply the best option for 
someone predisposed to anti-normative behavior, because it is less likely that he or she will get caught.  Katherine 
S. Williams, Using Tittle’s Control Balance Theory to Understand Computer Crime and Deviance, 22 INT‘L REV.
OF L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 145, 146 (2008). 
79 Diane Rowland, Griping, Bitching and Speaking Your Mind: Defamation and Free Expression on the 
Internet, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 519, 531 (2006) (citing S. Reicher, R.M. Levine, and E. Gordijn, More on 
Deindividuation, Power Relations Between Groups and the Expression of Social Identity, 37 BRIT. J. OF SOC.
PSYCHOL. 15 (1998). 
80 Id. at 531. 
81 See Edward Diener, Deindividuation: Causes and Consequences, 5 SOCIAL BEHAVIOR & PERSONALITY 
143, 145-146 (1977) (citing Zimbardo). 
82 Id. at 149. 
83 Williams, supra note 54 at 692 (citing P. Ellison, Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behaviour: A Field 
Study, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 256 (1995)). 
84 Id. (citing Zimbardo). 
85 Mary W. Lindhal & Michael L. Unger, Cruelty in Student Teaching Evaluations, 58 COLLEGE TEACHING 
71, 73 (2010). 
86 Williams, supra note 54, at 696.  
87 Griffiths et al., supra note 17, at 30. 
88 Id.  
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communication brings individuals into on-line groups where they may 
potentially act on the norms espoused by the group, thereby losing their 
sense of self-awareness.89  For the sake of balance, it is also important to 
point out the positive aspects of anonymity: people living under oppressive 
political regimes may seek out information from the rest of the world, and 
may allow for critique of the government without fear of repercussions.  
Anonymity can allow for more personal freedom – for better or worse. 
 Currently, the most significant commentary about anonymity, 
deindividuation and behavior on the Internet is in the context of free speech 
and defamation.90  Commentary has focused on harassment and its 
proliferation due to the anonymity of cyberbullies.91  The Internet and other 
technological advances allow bullying to continue around the clock, 
anonymously, and more maliciously.92  With a feeling of anonymity, bullies 
on the Internet act on impulse without reflection.93  As one commentator 
has noted, ―technology allows bullies to be meaner, more frequently, with 
more allies, before an inestimable audience.  It gives them a greater sense of 
invincibility and inhibits their fear of being caught or punished.‖94
Compared to these free speech and criminal law aspects, relatively little 
analysis is available on how anonymity drives commodification.  As many 
markets in cyberspace feature anonymous or semi-anonymous 
transactions, my contention is that they may encourage non-traditional 
markets to form. Aside from facilitating purchases,  markets also are 
socially constructed spaces, and in a capitalist economy, they play a vital 
role in social interactions.  Consider the local souk in a rural agricultural 
village.  The market brings buyers and sellers together to interact in a 
social space – they can commiserate about crop failures, animals, and 
perhaps learn about larger market trends as they talk amongst themselves.  
The participants will know each other personally, and will be repeat 
players.  
Participants in an online market, however, act in ways vastly different 
from the way they would in a village souk.  With technology, market 
participants have little or no information to tell them with whom they are 
dealing.  To substitute for the face-to-face interaction between buyers and 
89 Williams, supra note 54, at 693. 
90 See generally Susanna Moore, The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: Protecting John Doe on the Internet, 
26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L 469 (2009); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What 
Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1372 (2009); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: 
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).   
91 See generally Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 51 (2005); Citron, supra 
note 75.   
92 See Id., at 56; Mark Franek, Rise of the Cyberbully Demands New Rules, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 
10, 2004, at 9; Glenn R. Stutzky, Cyber Bullying Information, INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL 
RESEARCH, 
http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/Documents/Forums/2006_Mar_CYBER_BULLYING_INFORMATION_2006%20--
%20Provided%20by%20Mr.%20Glenn%20Stutzky.pdf (last visited Sep. 29, 2011);  
93 Franek, supra note 91. 
94 Id.  
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sellers, other proxies for trust have emerged via intermediaries. 95  For 
example, buyer and seller ratings on platforms such as eBay and 
Amazon.com may signal to the other party whether a participant is 
trustworthy.  If goods are shipped late, damaged, or broken, a seller may 
receive poor ratings, which would warn other purchasers to steer clear of 
that merchant.96
In the past, if a buyer wanted to purchase a good or service from the 
―gray market,‖ or even a good or service that might be legal, but was 
perhaps unsavory, it was difficult to make that purchase anonymously.  
Certain types of alcoholic beverages could only be purchased in certain 
places, from approved retailers, on particular days and times; alcohol 
bottles were hidden from view in brown paper bags.  The same is true of 
pornography or sexual aids. 97  If a person physically had to go out in 
public to a store in order to purchase such an item, there was the risk that 
they would be seen by a co-worker,  friend or neighbor.  Along with the 
purchase came the further risk that the purchaser might be judged or 
ridiculed.  Today, with anonymous online shopping, purchasers can buy 
anything from the most innocuous to the most embarrassing of items 
without revealing their identities.  Removing the inhibitions associated 
with providing one‘s name means many items can be monetized that 
would have been unthinkable before.   
The concepts of anonymity and deindividuation therefore become 
central to any discussion of cyber commodification.  Anonymity lends to 
the proliferation of taboo markets for two reasons.  If a participant in a 
taboo market does not want to be identified or held accountable for his or 
her participation in the marketplace, then the anonymity offered by the 
Internet is the sensible and rational medium for his or her transaction.  The 
Internet offers greater anonymity than face-to-face marketplaces, therefore, 
a participant, if concerned with stigma or judgment, will conduct his or her 
transaction anonymously on the Internet. 
As an additional matter, Internet marketplaces may display a particular 
culture or promote non-normative behavior.  If a specific website or 
marketplace invites an individual to join a group, the individual‘s 
membership in the group may cause a loss of self-awareness and 
deindividuation.   Membership on a website that then promotes a particular 
kind of unconventional marketplace could lead some individuals to a loss of 
self-awareness and deindividuation.  Here I focus on two unconventional 
markets are driven by anonymity, the online market for adultery and the 
market for baby naming rights.    
95 Lior Strahlavitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone (and Everything?),  81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 
(2006).  
96 EBAY (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.ebay.com. 
97 Indeed, pornography does a brisk business, with $2.8 billion estimated business per year online. Jon 
Swartz, Purveyors of Porn Scramble to Keep Up with Internet, U.S.A. TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/techinvestor/industry/2007-06-05-internet-porn_N.htm, June 12, 2007. 
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1.  The Market for Adultery 
With its branding tagline, ―Life is short, Have an affair,‖ 98 the dating 
website Ashley Madison focuses on a specific demographic:  those who 
are married.99  In the United States, the user demographic of the website 
is heavily male; but in Australia, where prostitution is legal, and married 
men often patronize prostitutes, married women often avail themselves of 
the website. 100  Before the advent of the Internet, those who were seeking 
to have an extra-marital affair could not trumpet their desires; a personal 
advertisement in a newspaper could lead to discovery by a spouse.  The 
Ashley Madison website, therefore, thrives on promoting a sense of 
anonymity in its users‘ affairs.
While posting a profile on the Ashley Madison website is free,  
contacting other members requires payment.101  Users can look at other 
member‘s profiles and ―test the waters,‖ but if they want to initiate 
contact, they have to purchase access. 102  Credit card charges show up 
under the name of an innocuous sounding business, so as not to alert a 
suspicious spouse that money is being spent on a dating website.103
Customers can also pay using other means, such as a money order, 
electronic funds transfer from their bank, or pre-paid gift card.104  These 
alternate methods of payment help a customer keep his or her use of the 
website hidden from a partner or spouse.     
Ashley Madison‘s business model depends on promoting a sense of 
anonymity among its users; and the website therefore strongly promotes 
the concept of privacy and anonymity as a key selling point for their 
customers.  The home page for the website features a woman holding her 
finger over her lips, illustrating the privacy the website offers. 105  The 
tagline under the website reads, ―The world‘s leading married dating 
service for discreet encounters,‖ with the word discreet emphasized. 106  A 
Time article discussed the latest marketing tactic used by 
AshleyMadison.com and other similar websites:  mobile cheating.107  The 
websites have created mobile applications or ―apps‖ to allow users to search 
online profiles via their cellular phones without leaving suspicious 
electronic trails on their home computer.108  Anonymity on the Internet, 
however indirectly, has led to the monetization of adultery. 
98 ASHLEY MADISON, http://www.ashleymadison.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
99 Id. 
100
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106Id.  
107Jeremy Caplan,  Cheating 2.0: New Mobile Apps Make Adultery Easier,  TIME, June 29, 2009, available 
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1909602,00.html. 
108Id.  
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2. Baby Names and Branding Rights 
Another example of anonymity facilitating the development of a 
market can be seen in the purchase and sale of baby naming rights.  On 
the Internet, markets have arisen to facilitate naming and branding.  
Selling naming rights to your child most probably would be seen as odd in 
a small community where everyone knows each other.  So odd in fact, 
that it might even be seen as a matter that should be prevented by law.  
After all,  most people name their children in a way that is meaningful 
within their family, or perhaps to give honor to an historical figure, not 
treated as a way to make money.  Despite that, today some parents are 
selling the rights to name their children online.109
There is historical precedent addressing the sale of baby names in 
the context of consideration doctrine.  In an influential 1882 case, Wolford 
v. Powers,110 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the right to name a child 
constituted good consideration.  In that case, an elderly friend of the family 
promised the sum of $10,000 to help the family‘s younger son complete his 
education, but asked in return that the child be named after him.  Although 
to a certain extent, this looked to the Court like a gift to the child, the Court 
reasoned that the father did give up the right to name his son, and that 
naming rights, in other contexts, such as a named university endowed chair, 
did have value.111  Thus the court enforced the promise, holding that 
consideration existed.112  A decade later in Diffenderfer v. Scott, an Indiana 
Appeals Court treated the consideration question as settled, quoting Wolford 
v. Powers.113  Similar decisions in other jurisdictions followed resting 
upon the same logic.114
For example,  the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted 
the Wolford precedent, noting in Eaton v. Libbey,  a 1896 case, that ―[w]e 
have no doubt that the privilege of naming a child is a valid consideration 
for a promise. . . Gifts to a child because of its name are common, and a 
change of name is often made the condition of a gift or bequest.‖115
Further, in 1914, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in 
Gardner v. Denison that the ―privilege of naming a child is a valid 
consideration for a promise to pay money . .  .  [the child] loses the 
109 What’s in a Name? Four Thousand Fifty Dollars,  FREAKONOMICS.COM,
http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/01/21/whats-in-a-name-four-thousand-and-fifty-
dollars/?scp= 1&sq= baby+ naming+ rights&st= nyt (last visited April 4, 2011).; Matthew Purdy, Our Towns; 
A Boy Named Soup,  N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/01/nyregion/our-towns-a-
boy-named-soup.html?scp= 3&sq= baby+ naming+ rights&st= nyt; Joshua Rhett Miller, Woman Blames eBay 
for Thwarting Baby Name Auction,  FOX NEWS, Aug.13, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,539311,00.html.
110 Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294 (Ind. 1882). 
111 Id.  at *7. 
112 Id.
113 Diffenderfer v. Scott, 5 Ind.App. 243 (Ind. App. 1892).
114 See, e.g.  Daily v. Minnick, 60 L.R.A. 840, 914 (Iowa 1902); Babock v. Chase, 36 N.Y.S. 879 (Sup. 
Ct. 1895); Shumm by Whyner v. Berg,  231 P.2d 39, 44 (Cal. 1951) (collecting cases).  
115 Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218, 220 (Mass. 1896).  
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opportunity or receiving a more advantageous name, and is compelled to 
bear whatever detriment may flow from the name imposed upon him.‖116
While at first,  the possibility of ―detriment‖ flowing from a name may 
seem somewhat odd  - other than in playground teasing - the popular book 
Freakonomics discusses, at length, the fact that certainly names may 
actually lead to better job and financial prospects than others.117
Many of these well-established precedents, however, involved a 
close relationship between an older, wealthier individual, at times with a 
blood tie with the family, and who was often a widow or widower without 
children.  For example, in Gardner v. Denison,  the court mentions that 
the elderly man who made the promise regarding the child‘s name was 
taken care of in his or her declining years by the child‘s parents. 118
However, after the will was read, no provision had been made for the 
child that had been named after him. 119  In this way, some of the 
―bargains‖ that were struck around the child‘s name seem like another 
way of formalizing extended familial and caretaking relationships. 
Modern day online auctions of naming rights to children, however,  
are structured as impersonal arms-length transactions.  Rather than 
looking like an arrangement to shore up extended familial relationships, 
these auctions look more like desperate pleas for money.  The bids are 
from parents in difficult financial circumstances who might be willing to 
name their child ―Xanax‖ or ―Clorox‖ for the right amount of money. 120
But at present time, that money does not seem to be forthcoming from 
corporations;121 perhaps they sense that these types of auctions are still 
somewhat gauche or taboo, and would not result in the type of ―good 
press‖ that most corporations seek for publicity purposes.  On the other 
hand, some might feel that any publicity is good publicity – which might 
explain why a casino paid $10,000 to advertise its brand on a woman‘s 
forehead.122
B.  Reduction of Geographic Barriers and Other Transaction Costs 
In addition to anonymity, other features of the Internet seem to promote 
the forces of cyber commodification.  These features include the 
116 Gardner v. Denison, 105 N.E.  359 (Mass. 1914). 
117 See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS (2005) (chapter discussing earning 
prospects for job seekers on the basis of their names); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily 
and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha And Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,  
(Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.(collecting empirical data showing that having an African American 
sounding name reduced the likelihood of receiving an interview when compared with similarly skilled and 
educated applicant with White sounding name).  See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario Barnes, By Any 
Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are 
White,  2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (2005).  
118 Gardner v. Denison, 105 N.E. 359 (Mass. 1914).  
119 Id. 
120 Don Oldenburg, Ringing Up Baby; Companies Yawned at Child Naming Rights, But Was It an Idea 
Ahead of Its Time?, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 13180849; Matthew Kauffman, 
Newborn Naming Game: No Takers, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 10671257 
121 Id. 
122Aaron Falk, Mom Sells Face Space for Tattoo Advertisement,  DESERTNEWS.COM (Jun. 30, 
2005),http://www.deseretnews.com/article/600145187/Mom-sells-face-space-for-tattoo-advertisement.html. 
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decreasing relevance of geography and even national borders,  and the lack 
of clear jurisdictional legal boundaries.   In short, the Internet lowers 
transaction costs dramatically, and this propels the forces of 
commodification.   The two clearest illustrations of these forces are virtual 
work and crowdfunding.  
1. Virtual Work 
As Internet and computer technology becomes increasingly ubiquitous 
and less expensive, it has opened the door for new ways to buy and sell 
not only objects, but also labor and time.  In a previous article, I 
described this phenomena, which I have termed ―virtual work,‖ but which 
has also been alternately described as ―labor as a service,‖ ―peer 
production,‖ or ―playbor.‖ 123  As noted by Randall Stross in The New 
York Times,  crowdsourcing technology has enabled the slicing of labor 
into small increments, micro-tasks that break down a large job into its 
lowest common denominator.124  After the tasks are farmed out to 
individual workers,  they are then re-aggregated and the overall job is 
completed.  This is a process known as crowdsourcing.125
In fact, millions of people worldwide entertain themselves or 
supplement their incomes – or both – by working within virtual worlds 
such as Second Life or casually ―clicking‖ to make a few dollars for 
simple tasks on websites like Amazon.com‘s Mechanical Turk. 126
Because the money in virtual worlds is convertible to real world money, 
virtual work is having an impact on real world economies.   One 
economist, Edward Castronova, has estimated that the economy of Sony‘s 
game EverQuest and its world, Norrath, has a GNP, per capita, 
equivalent to that of Bulgaria.127  Another commentator, discussing 
entrepreneurship in virtual worlds, had this to say: 
[V]irtual worlds are home to serious business conducted 
by hundreds of thousands of users. One study suggests 
that virtual economies may reach the size of small 
countries.  The business varies from mining virtual gold 
to real gambling and anything in-between.  Virtual world 
entrepreneurship is somewhat ironic. Much of the fun of 
virtual worlds is unpredictability. .  .  .  Yet,  
entrepreneurship thrives in these worlds. Like any 
123 See Trebor Scholz & Laura Liu, From Mobile Playgrounds to Sweatshop City,  SITUATED 
TECHNOLOGIES PAMPHLETS  7 (2010), http://www.situatedtechnologies.net/?q= node/105.  
124 See Stross, supra note 18. 
125 See, e.g.  Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-79 (using term 
―crowdsourcing‖ to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from diverse groups of users on the 
internet); Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses, A Manifesto for User-Generated 
Rights,  11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.  L. 921, 929 (2009) (―Computer technology in the hands of the masses has 
made available software programs that can create music, documents, and art just as well as expensive studios 
did in the past. This democratization of technology disrupts the monopoly on the creative means of production. 
The world of amateur production also demonstrates that many are motivated by noncommercial reasons.‖).
126 EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE GAMES 2-3
(2005). 
127 Id.  at 19-20. 
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economy, where there is a demand for something of value 
and someone willing to supply it,  a market will form.128
These pursuits are far more than mere ―games.‖  Recently, employment 
agencies like Manpower and Randstad have begun recruiting, collecting 
resumes and performing interviews with candidates on virtual worlds such 
as Second Life. 129  In the wake of the economic downturn, websites such 
as ELance, which serve to connect companies seeking short term help 
with workers willing to take on short term assignments, have been doing 
brisk business.130  Throughout cyberspace, workers hold various jobs that, 
in the words of leading commentators, make it possible to ―work in a 
fantasy world to pay rent in reality.‖131
Recently, Professor Jonathan Zittrain noted that the advent of 
virtual work simultaneously provides immense promise and peril for 
workers in the new digital economy.132  New technology allowing 
collaboration can provide remarkable opportunities for workers and 
employers alike.  Traditional limitations on collaboration  – of travel, of 
meeting, of commuting – can be minimized or reduced.  Employers can 
use virtual spaces to make contacts and recruit talent, without spending 
money on transportation.133  Certainly, the possibility of matching workers 
and jobs in cyberspace creates more opportunities and more efficient labor 
128 Michael Risch, Virtual Rule of Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) (internal citations omitted).   See 
also Andrea Vanina Arias, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords and Armor: Regulating the Theft of Virtual 
Goods,  57 EMORY L.J. 1301, 1302 (2008) (citing sources estimating that trade in virtual goods amounts from 
approximately $200 million to $2 billion a year); Michael Capiro, Virtual Worlds with Real-World Losses,  56 
FED. LAW. 12 (Dec. 2009) (reporting estimate from investment banking firm Piper Jaffray that virtual sales of 
goods amounted to $621 million in 2009 and were expected to grow to $2.3 billion by 2013); Theodore P. 
Seto, When is a Game Only a Game?: The Taxation of Virtual Worlds,  77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027 (2009) (noting 
that Ailin Graef, ―a Chinese-born citizen and resident of Germany, had parlayed an initial investment of $9.95 
into virtual communities and other virtual holdings having a real-world fair market value, in the aggregate, of 
more than one million dollars.  In theory, Graef could have pulled her Second Life earnings out at any time; at 
some point, she did in fact withdraw enough to found an 80-employee real-world company.‖).
129 Both Manpower and Randstad have advertisements posted on YouTube touting their recruiting services 
in Second Life.  See, e.g.  Virtual Jobs at Ronstad, YOUTUBE.COM, (Apr. 12, 2007) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= k5xF43POYv8&feature= PlayList&p= 7B20448ABA3A94B8&playnext= 1
&playnext_from= PL&index= 43 (advertisement for Randstad); Manpower‘s Machinima on the World of 
Virtual Work, Youtube.com (July 12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= sNjxucDI8bo (advertisement 
for Manpower);  
130 See Ann Meyer, Fewer Strings a Draw for Employers, Virtual Contract Workers, Internet Tools help 
Firms Grow, Afford to Add Talent,  CHI. TRIB. ,  Nov. 23, 2009, at 19 (noting that ―[y]ear-over-year project 
hiring on Elance rose 40 percent in October, and more than 300,000 jobs have been posted on the Web site 
during the past 12 months‖).  Cf.  Emma L. Carew, Tough Times Lead many into Virtual Work World,  STAR-
LEDGER, July 12, 2009 (noting that that the poor economy has pushed many employers into hiring virtual 
office assistants). 
131 F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds,  92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004). 
132 Jonathan Zittrain, Work the New Digital Sweatshops,  NEWSWEEK,  Dec. 8, 2009 (―It all sounds great, 
and in many ways, it is.  The Internet has created new markets for human labor potentially gleaned anywhere 
in the world . .  .  [but] online contracting circumvents a range of labor laws and practices found in most 
developed countries that govern worker protections, minimum wage, health and retirement benefits, child 
labor, and so forth.‖); See also Robert D. Hof, The End of Work as You Know It,  BUS. WK. 80, Aug. 20, 
2007, at 80 available at 2007 WLNR 15875667 (―Will this be a new world of empowered individuals encased in 
a bubble of time-saving technologies? Or will it be a brave new world of virtual sweatshops, where all but a tech-
savvy few are relegated to an always-on world in which keystrokes, contacts, and purchases are tracked and fed 
into the faceless corporate maw?‖).
133 See, e.g.  Gabrielle Monaghan, A Virtual Way to Find Real Talent, SUNDAY TIMES, March 16, 2008, 
at 19 (describing KPMG and Accenture recruiting events on Second Life, and the fact that the Manpower 
recruiting agency has also opened an island within Second Life); Joel Dresang, Manpower Opens Office in 
Online Virtual Society,  MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 13, 2007 at D1. 
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markets.134  These changes can benefit workers,  in part by increasing 
flexibility and allowing workers more control over when and how they are 
able to perform work. 135 In addition, employees have used virtual worlds 
as part of their protected right to organize and to protest. 136  For example,  
in September, 2007, over 2,000 employers protested IBM Italy‘s pay 
package by appearing at IBM‘s headquarters in Second Life. 137
Virtual work, however, presents many of the same enduring 
problems that workers‘ rights advocates have struggled with over the 
years. Gold farming operations and other types of virtual work have been 
criticized by commentators as creating new ―virtual sweatshops.‖ 138  For 
years corporations have engaged in races to the bottom, not only in 
selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation that will govern their internal 
corporate affairs, 139 but also to find the jurisdictions with the cheapest 
labor and the least regulation of employment relationships.140  The concern 
about virtual work is that it will lead to further acceleration of the race to 
the bottom and ultimately the further erosion of worker‘s rights and 
benefits. 141
In a popular press article, Professor Jonathan Zittrain set out a useful 
typology of crowdsourcing based on the level of knowledge required in 
order to complete a given work task. 142  In the level requiring the most 
skill,  companies post difficult scientific problems and promise a reward 
for the answer.  For example, on the Innocentive website, 143 highly skilled 
scientists try to solve complicated problems in order to reap financial 
prizes.  In the middle skill level, some websites rate and grade workers at 
various tasks to ensure quality control for routine backroom operations, 
such as that performed by customer service representatives.  For example, 
134 See Kermit Pattison, How to Enlist a Global Work Force of Freelancers,  N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009 
(noting ways in which working with freelancers can increase productivity); Cf.  ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN 
SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003). 
135 Carol Sladek & Ellie Hollander, Where is Everyone? The Rise of Workplace Flexibility,  BENEFITS Q., 
April 1, 2009, at 17 (noting that flexibility is ―being able to be at Little League at 3:30 in the afternoon, with 
the ability to catch up on work after dinner with the family.  Flexibility is a way for the employer to 
acknowledge and enable the whole person.‖).
136 29 U.S.C. §151-169 (2000).
137 On Strike, Virtually,  THE ECONOMIST, March 15, 2008, at 87, available at 2008 WLNR 5068500. 
138 See David Barboza, Ogre to Slay? Outsource it to Chinese,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005 at A1; Cf.
Wendy Duong, Ghetto’ing Third World Workers with Hi-Tech: Industrial Application of Artificial Intelligence 
and its Effect on Foreign Direct Investment in the Third World – Exploring Regulatory Solutions Through an 
Emblematic Case for the New Economy,  21 TEMPLE INT‘L & COMP. L. J. 63 (2008). 
139 See, e.g. Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition For 
Corporate Charters In The Presence of Network Effects,  31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681 (2003) (describing the 
decision process of choosing a jurisdiction of incorporation).  
140 See, e.g.  Raul Delgado Wise & James M. Cyper, NAFTA, Labor, and the National State: The 
Strategic Role of Mexican Labor under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Integration,  610
ANNALS 120 (2007) (discussing the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on outsourcing); 
Keith Woffinden, Surfing the Next Wave of Outsourcing: The Ethics of Sending Domestic Legal Work to 
Foreign Countries Under New York City Opinion 2006-3, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 483 (2007) (discussing the 
legal and ethical implications of outsourcing legal work); Christina Laun, The Central American Free Trade 
Agreement and the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing,  17 IND. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 431 (2007) (considering 
impact of Central American Free Trade Agreement on U.S. manufacturing industries); Archie A. Alexander 
III, American Diagnostic Radiology Moves Offshore: Where Is The “Internet Wave” Taking This Field?,  20 J.
L. & HEALTH 199 (2006/2007) (analyzing outsourcing of medical services).  
141 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To The Yukon and Beyond: Local Laborers In A Global Market,  3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93 (1999) (describing race to the bottom phenomenon within global labor 
markets). 
142 Jonathan Zittrain, Work the New Digital Sweatshops,  NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 2009. 
143 INNOCENTIVE, http://www.innocentive.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
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on LiveOps,144 telephone calls are routed to individual customer service 
workers on their cellphones.  Finally, at the lowest end, there is work that 
encompasses tasks that require only minimal awareness, such as the entry 
of a few characters or the clicking of a mouse in a second or two.  
Regardless of the level of skill involved, crowdsourcing takes the products 
of many workers to create something greater than the sum of its parts. 145
Crowdsourcing and other types of distributed work are likely to 
increase in frequency in the years to come.  While once Amazon‘s 
Mechanical Turk was synonymous with crowdsourcing, there are now 
many more websites that promise to help users harness the power of the 
crowd.  The tasks that can be assigned through crowdsourcing are 
virtually limitless.146  Other websites work subtly, sometimes without the 
knowledge of the user.  For example,  to prevent websites and blogs from 
being swamped with ―spam‖ from automated comment generators, many 
sites require users to enter a word.  The reCAPTCHA software uses this 
anti-spam device to digitize books and newspapers by aggregating them 
one word at a time.147  In another twist, some websites are using fun 
games to entice users to work for them.  For example, one website 
presents players with puzzles, the answers to which help scientists to 
determine how proteins fold.148  Crowdsourcing has been used to check 
surveillance cameras between the United States - Mexico border to look 
for aliens, and to use computers to help SETI in their search for different 
types of aliens.149
 Other forms of virtual work blur the line between work and 
leisure.  A number of China‘s new ―factories‖ feature computer workers, 
typing and clicking away, playing video games, collecting coins and 
swords, and fighting monsters. 150 Known as ―gold farmers,‖ these 
workers are paid to harvest virtual treasures for online gamers in the 
developed world.  These First World gamers want to advance quickly 
within the game and, tired of the repetitive tasks necessary to build a high-
level character, would prefer to pay others to do the work. 151  As a result,  
gold farming operations have appeared in many Third World countries, 
144 LIVEOPS, http://www.liveops.com (last visited Mar. 2,  2012). 
145 Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing,  WIRED, June 2006, at 176, 178-79 (using term 
―crowdsourcing‖ to describe work performed with the aid of contributions from diverse groups of users on the 
internet). 
146 Pamela Licalzi O‘Connell,  Mining the Minds of the Masses,  N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2010 at 
G1(describing NASA‘s use of crowdsourcing); Jamar Younger, Students Aid Mars Scientists,  ARIZ. DAILY 
STAR, Feb. 28, 2008, at 4.  
147 RECAPTCHA, http://recaptcha.net/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
148 FOLDIT.COM, http://www.foldit.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  The game is described in more detail 
in Lewis Dartnell, Your Computer Needs You, Addictive online games that tap your brainpower without you 
noticing can help to crack problems that have defeated the most powerful computers, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 8, 
2008, at 36.  
149 See Benkler, supra note 33, at 81-83. 
150 David Barboza, Ogre to Slay? Outsource it to Chinese,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005 at A1. 
151 According to another recent article on the Chinese gold farmers, there are now three models for 
reaping the bounty of the virtual world.  In the traditional, more typical model which is the one described 
above, the gold farmers use their experienced characters in order to perform repetitious tasks, garner valuables, 
and then, through intermediaries, sell the virtual property in exchange for cash.  In the second model, called 
―leveling,‖ a wealthy player will pay the gold farmers to play his character twenty-four hours a day, allowing 
the character to become vastly powerful in a short period.  Finally, the third model involves assembling a team 
of Chinese players, who guide the first-world player to the highest levels, and then let the first world player 
receive the most valuable objects (which cannot be sold).  See Julian Dibbell, The Life of a Chinese Gold 
Farmer,  N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.  
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where labor costs are low. 152  For example, a company named Blacksnow 
opened operations in Tijuana, Mexico, paying Mexican nationals dollars a 
day to kill dragons and obtain objects in Mythic Entertainment‘s online 
Camelot game.153  Acting as an intermediary, Blacksnow later resold these 
virtual objects on eBay154 and other online exchange sites to high bidders 
in First World countries, thereby taking advantage of lower labor costs in 
developing nations.155  Another model that uses these relative differences 
in wages is to have Third World computer workers ―play‖ the characters 
of First World gamers while they sleep. 156  Workers in Third World 
countries are playing these online games not as entertainment, but as a 
means of making a living.157  Their alternatives may include far more 
dangerous work in a dirty, crowded, and unsafe factory or barely scraping 
by as a subsistence farmer. 158
All of this is to say that, because of the way crowdsourcing  
technology has developed, and the existing vacuum in meaningful 
regulation, virtual work straddles the line between commodified and non-
commodified activity.  Virtual work, rather like many other aspects of 
emerging technologies on the internet, is a diverse mix of free 
collaboration coexisting with monetized and commodified settings. 159  As 
Professor Lior Strahilevitz  has described, one of the models for clickwork 
depends on collaboration, and this collaboration is not always successful if 
the market economics are subtracted from the equation. 160  It may be that 
virtual worlds may be big enough for several economies (or non-
economies, as the case may be) to coexist with each other.  Here is a 
controversial question:  could non-commodification lead to the 
exploitation of virtual workers?  I will return to this question in the last 
152 Id.
153 When Mythic Entertainment attempted to shut down Blacksnow‘s trading site, Blacksnow brought suit 
in the Central District of California, but the suit was settled before trial.   Complaint, Blacksnow Interactive v. 
Mythic Entm‘t Inc., No. 02-00112 (C.D. Cal. Filed Feb. 5, 2002).  See also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, 
Novel Legal Issues in Virtual Property,  234 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col. 1), Aug. 9, 2005 (describing complaint and legal 
issues surrounding complaint).   
154 EBAY, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (well-known internet auction website).  
155 Class Action Complaint, Hernandez v. Internet Gaming Entm‘t, Ltd., No. 07-21403-Civ (S.D. Fla. 
filed May 31, 2007), available at 2007 WL 1799038.  In this pending lawsuit, users who played the game 
World of Warcraft sued an online auction website that employed gold farmers, alleging that the monetization 
and sale of virtual property devalued the currency in the world and removed scarce resources.  The complaint 
alleged that ―IGE gold farmers are often citizens of developing third would countries who spend up to 14 hours 
per day, or more, logged into World of Warcraft collecting resources and world of Warcraft gold.‖ Id.  at 8.  
See also Complaint, Blizzard Entm‘t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, L.L.C., No. 07-0589 (C.D. Cal. Filed on May 
22, 2007) (terminated after permanent injunction granted, Jan. 28, 2008); Complaint, MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. 
Blizzard Entm‘t., Inc., No. 06-2555 (D. Ariz. 2006 filed on Oct. 25, 2006). 
156 See Dibbell,  supra note 151. 
157 David Barboza, Video Game Sweatshops? Chinese Players Toil for Virtual Booty,  INT‘L HERALD 
TRIB., Dec. 9, 2005, at 1.  
158 According to 2003 data from an ILO survey, average employees in different countries work varying 
numbers of hours.  In the United States, the average employee worked slightly more than 40 hours per week.  
Americans worked more than the French, whose workers averaged 35.5 hours, and worked more than most of 
the average workers in countries in industrialized Europe.  However, workers in the developing world worked 
much harder, with more hours worked in Argentina, China, and Mexico.  The hardest working country was 
Egypt, where employees worked on average fifty-seven hours per week.  See SANGHEON LEE, ET.AL.,
WORKING TIME AROUND THE WORLD: TRENDS IN WORKING HOURS, LAWS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2003). 
159 For example, while the internet is encouraging a culture of sharing, open source software, and 
distributed, collaborative work, see Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm,  
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002), many aspects of  virtual worlds or crowdsourcing are commodified.   
160 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets,  116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1498 (2007). 
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section of the Article.  
2.  Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding is an excellent illustration of the forces of cyber 
commodification.  While traditionally, there have been numerous barriers 
to raising investment capital, such as the limited number of individuals 
with large amounts of money to invest or an innovator' s limited ability to 
find and contact those individuals, these barriers can be overcome through 
new crowdfunding models.   
Crowdfunding appeals to those with small amounts of money to 
invest.  Crowdfunding websites allow entrepreneurs to communicate 
information about their businesses and endeavors to a larger audience.  
According to a recent book, crowdfunding covers a multitude of activities: 
Crowfunding describes the collective cooperation, attention 
and trust by people who network and pool their money and 
other resources together,  usually via the Internet,  to support 
efforts initiated by other people or organizations . .  .  The 
crowdfunding space is quite diverse, comprised of many 
niches, and shares a lot of social networking‘s energy.  
Whether to solicit donations and create a fan base for an 
around-the-world sailing adventure, to pre-sell copies of a 
book, or to finance a startup in return for equity, some 
form of crowdfunding is available. 161
Pooling their money allows individuals with only small amounts to invest 
the ability to join in the market, often helping artists and musicians 
produce their work and or to help charitable organizations get off the 
ground.162
Until very recently, there was no exemption from the securities laws 
for crowdfunding, since a general solicitation on a website would have 
run afoul of the 1933 Securities and Exchange Act rules against 
unregistered public offerings. 163   As a result, in recent years 
crowdfunding websites turned to alternate and creative investment forms.  
For example, some crowdfunding websites followed the model of the 
website Kiva,164 which promotes microfinance, and which promises no 
return or interest on the amount, just a return of the capital.  In these 
ways people can put up small amounts of money for a good cause, rather 
like a donation to a social entrepreneurship model like the Grameen Bank.  
161 KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION 1-2 (2010). 
162 Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws – Why 
any Specially Tailored Exemption Should be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure 1 (Feb. 20, 2012 
(forthcoming available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1954040). 
163 For a comprehensive analysis of the Securities and Exchange Act provisions pre-existing the JOBS 
Act, see Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the 
Securities Act of 1933,  78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 961 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1875584; C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the 
Federal Securities Laws,  COLUM. BUS. L. J. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1916184. 
164 KIVA, http://www.kiva.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
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Other websites,  like Kickstarter165 and IndieGoGo,166 provided those who 
put up money a return in the form of discounted products or free 
merchandise, but not the traditional monetary dividend traditionally 
associated with stock. 167
In April, 2012, the JOBS Act was signed into law, creating a small 
exemption for crowdfunding.  The new law allows for a limited 
exemption for crowdfunding of up to $1 million per year,  with certain 
limits on amounts per each investor including to annual income or net 
worth, with particular requirements that crowdsourcing websites and 
companies on using those websites must meet.168  Needless to say, the 
regulatory atmosphere for crowdfunding has now changed dramatically.  
Professor Steven Bradford, however, notes that the costs of complying 
with the crowdfunding exemption may be high enough that only high 
profile or well-funded companies may be able to use it; of course that 
somewhat defeats the purpose of assisting start-up companies with their 
financing.169  While the regulatory environment for crowdfunding has 
improved, we will need to see whether barriers to entry will inhibit its 
growth.        
III. The Process of Cyber Commodification 
Historically, it is not uncommon for innovation to start with gifted 
amateurs inventing or acting out of passion, then for the advance to be 
taken over by business people and investors who integrate the innovation 
into the existing economy and develop it for profit.  One could think about 
the development of cellphones and their relationship to the earlier ham 
radio operators on the autopatch.  Thinking back to the Huffington Post 
example, what began as a gathering akin to a liberal town hall meeting 
eventually became something closer to a for-profit new-media business.  
In this section, the business model of craigslist, the monetization of 
Facebook, and the growth of social entrepreneurship are examined.   
A.  Free or Not to Be?: The Clash between eBay and Craigslist 
In 2004, online auction giant eBay170 sought to acquire craigslist, 171 the 
largest online site for classified advertisements in North America.  While 
two of craigslists‘ founders, Craig Newmark and John Buckmaster, were 
not interested in selling the company, they were amenable to having eBay 
buy out the shares of the remaining (third) shareholder, who was actively 
165 KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
166 INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
167Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It‘s Time for the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
Approve a Small Offering Exemption 105-109 (Aug. 26, 2011) (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1916985). 
168 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Title III, H.R. 3606 (April 2012).  
169 C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled,  40 SEC. REG. L.
J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2066088. 
170 EBAY, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
171 CRAIG‘S LIST, http://www.craigslist.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
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shopping his shares.172  Understanding that they would only acquire a 
minority holding of 28.4%, eBay sought to protect its interests through 
cumulative voting rights.173  Mathematically, cumulative voting would 
give eBay one seat on the three-person craigslist board with Newmark and 
Buckmaster as the two other directors. 174  From their perspective,  
Newmark and Buckmaster were concerned that eBay would take what 
they learned as shareholders and use that information to compete against 
craigslist.175  As such, they built in provisions to remove certain rights 
from eBay‘s equity shares if eBay started a competing business. 176
From the beginning, the relationship between eBay and craigslist was 
particularly fraught.  In his 2010 opinion, Chancellor Chandler 
categorized the two companies as ―oil and water.‖ 177  Expounding upon 
this theme, Chancellor Chandler explained: 
Even though both companies enjoy household-name 
status, craigslist and eBay are, to put it mildly, different 
animals.  Indeed, the two companies are a study in 
contrasts, with different business strategies, different 
cultures, and different perspectives on what it means to 
run a successful business . .  .   Though a for-profit 
concern, craigslist largely operates its business as a 
community service.  Nearly all classified advertisements 
are placed on craigslist free of charge.  Moreover,  
craigslist does not sell advertising space on its website to 
third parties.  .  .   For most of its history craigslist has not 
focused on monetizing its site.  The relatively small 
amount of monetization craigslist has pursued (for select 
job postings and apartment listings) does not approach 
what many craigslist competitors would consider an 
optimal or even minimally acceptable level.  .  .   eBay is a 
for-profit concern that operates its business with an eye to 
maximizing revenues, profits, and market share .  .  .  It has 
a large management team and a formal management 
structure.  It employs over 16,000 people at multiple 
locations around the world… It might be said that ―eBay‖ 
is a moniker for monetization and that ―craigslist‖ is 
anything but.178
The clash of values played itself out in the years after eBay‘s investment 
and eventually led to the dispute that landed the parties in the Delaware 
courts. During this time, eBay advised craigslist on ways to monetize the 
website, while Craig Newmark and John Buckmaster rebuffed eBay‘s 
172 eBay v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 9-10 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
173 Id. ,  at 11. 
174Id.   
175 Id. ,  at 13. 
176 Id.   
177 Id. ,  at 7. 
178 Id. ,  at 8-9. 
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suggestions.179  Meanwhile, eBay decided to launch its own competing 
platform for online classifieds, Kijiji.com.180  Launching the competing 
website triggered serious consequences for eBay‘s investment, leading its 
shares to lose some of their associated rights,  per the original terms of the 
investment contract. 181  Chancellor Chandler ruled that while the new 
staggered board structure that craigslist put in place was contemplated by 
the shareholder‘s agreement and was permissible, the poison pill and right 
of first refusal provisions were impermissible. 182
 In discussing the implementation of the poison pill,  and the threat 
to its corporate culture that craigslist perceived, the Delaware Chancery 
Court engaged in a lengthy discussion about profit maximization.  As the 
Court noted in discussing the craigslist business model: 
Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe 
craigslist should not be about the business of stockholder 
wealth maximization, now or in the future .  .  .  The 
corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is 
not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, 
at least not when there are other stockholders interested in 
realizing a return on their investment.  Jim and Craig 
opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for profit Delaware 
corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars 
from eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay became 
a stockholder.  Having chosen a for-profit corporate form 
the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties 
and standards that accompany that form.  Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for 
the benefit of its stockholders.  The ―Inc.‖ after the 
company name has to mean at least that. 183
Here, the court privileged eBay‘s more traditional business model and the 
concept of shareholder primacy above craigslist‘s ―public service‖ 
business model.184  But in the new Internet economy, the business model 
craiglist uses is not as odd as Chancellor Chandler‘s opinion might lead us 
to believe.  Many of us would pay a few cents to query directions from an 
online GPS mapping program each time we used it.   Others would pay to 
get information that is now freely available on wikipedia or other 
websites.  Instead, however, these services choose not to monetize, 
instead building a free, open access service.   
179 Id. ,  at 15; Ina Steiner, eBay Founder Pierre Omidyar Testifies in eBay v. Craigslist Trial, 
ECOMMERCEBYTES.COM (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/cab/abn/y09/m12/i08/s01.  
180 eBay, 16 A.3d, at 17. 
181 eBay, 16 A.3d, at 20. 
182 eBay, 14 A.3d at 33, 48. 
183 eBay, 16 A.3d, at 34. 
184 For commentary on the dueling business models involved in the case, see Joshnua Fershee, 
Philanthropy as a Business Model: Comparing Ford to Craigslist,  BUSINESS LAW PROF BLOG, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business law/2010/09/philanthropy-as-a-business-model-comparing-ford-to-
craigslist.htlml (last visited Jan. 18, 2012); Dealbook, Craigslist Meets the Capitalists,  NYTIMES.COM (May 2, 
2008); Steven M. Davidoff, What’s Next for eBay, Craigslist and the Poison Pill,  NYTIMES.COM (Sept. 13, 
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/whats-next-for-ebay-craigslist-and-poison-pills/. 
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Similarly, rather than try to achieve maximum returns by wringing 
every advertising dollar from its site, craigslist opted to build its user base 
with a free and uncomplicated interface.  By charging landlords a small 
fee to list properties in New York City, and also charging employers for 
listing want-ads, craigslist keeps itself afloat while attaining modest 
returns.  If the format of the website were to change too drastically, 
including too much monetization, craigslist might encounter resisistance 
from users.  In other words, once a non-commodified website begins to 
include too many monetized elements, it might risk losing its user base.  
Too much monetization too quickly could prove to be the end of many a 
once-convenient website.  And without the power of the crowd behind it,  
a business that relies on user input and content may find itself out of 
business entirely. 
 Despite all of these possible justifications for craigslist to operate 
as it did, the Delware Chancery Court insisted upon analyzing the 
problem through the narrow lens of shareholder profit maximization.  As 
such the ―eBay model‖ was triumphant.  In light of this holding, it might 
be best for us to acknowledge that the temptation to monetize something 
free may always be there, not just because of moral hazard, but also 
because corporate law might suggest such a result as the default rule. 185
Whether this default is normatively desirable may be another question.186
The monetization of friendship also is a part of the process of cyber 
commodification, and I turn to that discussion in the next subpart.  
B.  Social NetWORKing 
Another example of the process of commodification can be seen in the 
monetization of friendship.  Currently valued at an estimated $100 
billion,187 Facebook can be both a valuable personal and business 
networking application.188  Indeed, in both the for-profit and non-profit 
sectors, social networking is hailed as a major trend. 189  Traditionally, 
friendship is seen as a gift freely given, separate and apart from money. 190
With the advent of social networking, however, the monetization of 
friendship is increasingly possible and companies are beginning to take 
advantage of this new business model.  However, the commodification of 
friendship may have some unintended consequences.   
As Stephanie Rosenbloom reports in the New York Times,  ―imagine a 
185 Dodd v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  
186 Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy,  75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 
(2002); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodd v. Ford,  3 VAND. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008); 
Judd Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance,  
94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009). 
187 See, e.g.  Anupretta Das, Face-Off Over Facebook IPO,  WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, at C1. 
188 Facebook has over 800 million users, according to their estimates.  Statistics,  FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).  See also Stephanie 
Rosenblum, On Facebook, Scholars Link up with Data,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/style/17facebook.html?ref= stephanierosenbloom. 
189 According to one recent estimate, the average American spends over eight hours a day in front of a 
screen, whether that is computer, cell, or television, with teenagers receiving over 2,000 text messages per month.  
See Nicholas Carr, Is the Internet Making Us Quick But Shallow?, CNN.com (June 7, 2010).   
190 See generally Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law,  54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 631, 642-54 (2007) 
(describing characteristics of friends; money conspicuously absent from this description).  
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world in which we are assigned a number that indicates how influential we 
are.‖ 191  New businesses such as Klout, 192 PeerIndex,193 and Twitter 
Grader194 datamine social media activities and assign those who use them 
so-called influence scores. 195  These scores are based on online social 
networking activity, and increase depending on the number of followers 
and friends that a user has been able to attract. 196  And as a user 
recommends a business to the user‘s social network friends and they 
follow suit, the user‘s influence score rises.   Currently, those with high 
scores get preferential treatment from retailers.   According to the story, 
more than 2,500 marketers are now using Klout‘s data, including 
companies as diverse as Audi and the Las Vegas Palms. 197
In a blog post analyzing the New York Times article, Professor 
Danielle Citron writes: 
What‘s troubling is the trend‘s implications for society 
and culture.  It seems old school to say that people blog, 
make friends, and engage in online chats to play, 
experiment, and create culture.   Now, they may feel 
pressured to do all of these things as a matter of economic 
necessity.  We may forgo experimentation for product 
endorsements, and idle chatter for better job prospects.   
This makes our children‘s choice to engage with social 
media seem like less of choice than a carefully cultivated 
necessity.198
As Professor Citron‘s comment contemplates, and as the previous section 
describing crowdsourcing has noted, the divide between ―virtual work‖ 
and ―virtual leisure‖ is a difficult one.  So too is the gap between what is 
fun and pleasurable on Facebook and what provides a monetary benefit. 
Using Facebook is free,  but every user helps expand the monetization as 
they represent an addition to the audience for potential advertising.  
Facebook merely provides the platform.  On its own, without someone‘s 
friends on it as members as well, Facebook would not provide a very 
satisfying experience.  Rather, it is the user-generated content, which 
Facebook then owns, that provides the true value of the website.  
C.  From Networking to Social Entrepreneurship 
The idea that social ties are valuable and subject to monetization 
certainly is one example of cyber commodification.  But there are other,  
191 Stephanie Rosenblum, Got Twitter? You’ve Been Scored,  N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/sunday-review/26rosenbloom.html?ref= stephanierosenbloom. 
192 KLOUT, https://www.klout.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
193 PEERINDEX, http://www.peerindex.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
194 TWITTER GRADER, http://www.tweet.grader.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).  
195 Rosenblum, supra note 191. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Danielle Citron, Scoring Ourselves to Economic Death,  CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 28, 2011, 6:24
PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/scoring-ourselves-to-economic-death.html. 
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more philanthropic ways of combining business, social networking, and 
technology, specifically in the form of a new model called social 
entrepreneurship.  As one author explains, ―to qualify as social 
entrepreneurship, the activity must not only be entrepreneurial and social 
in nature, but also groundbreaking in scale and effect.‖199  Professor Celia 
Taylor notes that for a business model to qualify as social 
entrepreneurship, an ―entity must engage in ordinary, viable business 
enterprise. .  .   however,  a social business must be created and run for the 
express purpose of pursuing specific, articulated social goals, rather than 
maximizing profits.‖200  The concept is somewhat related to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), for social entrepreneurs, in common with 
those who believe in CSR, aim to provide two interrelated goals, financial 
profit and social progress. 201  As one author explains, however, they are 
different in the sense that social entrepreneurship is of necessity built into 
the business, rather than CSR, which may in some instances be ―bolted 
on.‖202  Without the social goal, the socially entrepreneurial business 
would not exist.203
As social entrepreneurship is a fairly new concept, there are not 
yet many concrete examples, and defining a social business can result in 
some measure of interpretation and debate.  One current business model 
that seems to exemplify social entrepreneurship is microfinance.  Grameen 
Bank founder Muhammad Yunus conceived of his plan for microfinance 
based on his own observations of Bangladeshi poverty and the provision 
of small personal loans from his own pocket. 204  The idea was to assist 
some of the poorest people in the world by providing seed money for 
small businesses that would also enrich their communities by providing 
much-needed services.  In such a way, a small amount of money could 
yield large social dividends.   Today, the Gremeen Bank has grown with 
international philanthropic support, but ―Grameencredit‖  maintains as its 
most distinctive feature that the loans are based on trust,  not collateral. 205
Other programs may help teach those living in poverty skills such as 
installing solar panels, which can help that person financially, and also 
increase the standard of living in impoverished communities.      
Individuals will likely donate either their money or time to socially 
199 See David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 297 (2008). 
200 Celia R. Taylor, The Second Annual Symposium of the Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law 
and Society, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1501, 1506 (2011).    
201 See, e.g.  Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How The Business 
Judgment Rule Protects A Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 
634 (2007).  See also What is Social Entrepreneurship? The New Heroes,  PBS.ORG (2005),
http://www.pbs.org/opb/thenewheroes/whatis/ . 
202 MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS 3-4 (ABA
2011). 
203 Id. 
204 First Loan he gave was $27 from own pocket,  THE DAILY STAR (Oct. 14, 2006) 
http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/10/14/d6101401033.htm.  
205 What is Mircocredit?, GRAMEEN BANK (July 2011), http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option= com_content&task= view&id= 28&Itemid= 108.  On the other hand, Kerr 
attributes social entrepreneurship to philanthropy by wealthy technology investors.  As she puts it, the ― idea of 
social entrepreneurship was born in the early 1990‘s when a handful of wealthy executives and investors, most 
of them connected in some way to the budding tech boom, began to think about how philanthropy might work 
differently and about how they could take what made them rich in business and apply those tactics to charity.‖   
Kerr, supra note 201 at 624. 
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entrepreneurial ventures from purely philanthropic motivations, and while 
these may be the motivations for corporate donations as well, a business 
might have other goals in engaging in social entrepreneurship.  Investing 
and participating in social businesses can uncover new markets for the sale 
of goods and services.  As one commentator notes, ―social ventures can 
provide important access to markets, which companies can then capitalize 
on with their profit-maximizing operations.‖206  Corporations can also 
benefit from engaging in social business as a research opportunity to learn 
about the people, the culture, and the resources in the particular 
geographic area where a social enterprise is implemented. 207
In other words, social entrepreneurship is a composite of various 
business models, with a lesser degree of commodification.  Other such 
―hybrid‖ business models are currently being developed, including 
businesses that focus on sustainability and those that have registered as B 
Corporations.208  The urge for profit helps individuals while also 
benefiting communities and leading to an increase in knowledge and 
human capital.  While many of the problems and disputes surrounding 
commodification involve an incongruous clash of expectations around 
profit, social entrepreneurship may provide a template for navigating 
mixed or partially commodified business models.  Other ways of 
reconciling cyber commodification, however, have not been so successful.   
And so from the topic of the process of cyber commodification, we turn to 
the area of contests and disputes.  
IV.  Contests and Disputes 
As we saw in the Introduction, differing expectations over the nature 
of the Huffington Post – whether the blog was intended as an online 
forum for the liberal community or a for-profit entity – created a clash of 
values and ultimately led to a lawsuit.  Whether it is the expectations of 
virtual workers, the question of whether predictions about the future can 
be monetized, or how access to legal research materials should be 
apportioned, the same questions of commodification and conflicting 
expectations run throughout many of the examples provided.  We have 
seen that commodification is not necessarily bad – in virtual work, in fact, 
it may be a necessity to ensure that workers receive a living wage.  
However, disputes tend to occur when one group comes to a contractual 
relationship believing that they are participating in a non-commodified 
website, when really the creators of the website have monetization of the 
206 Taylor, supra note 200, at 1507. 
207 Taylor,  supra note 200,   at 1508. 
208 B Corporations, or ―Benefit Corporations‖  are hybrids between for-profit and non-profit companies.  As a 
―B Corporation,‖ a company pledges to work toward other factors other than profit, including environmental 
impact, positive treatment of workers, and community relations.  The company then files independently verified 
reports documenting their efforts in order to maintain B Corporation status.  See e.g. Antony Page & Robert A. 
Katz, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010); Danielle Douglas, Benefit Corporations Sign Up, 
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 24, 2011, at A11; Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0 – A 
Breakthrough in Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047 (2011).
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website in mind.  In this section, I wish to examine some of the instances 
where there have been contests and disputes over cyber commodification.  
Here I begin with an analysis of the commodification of knowledge in 
prediction markets, then shift to the market for legal research, and end 
with an analysis of ―free‖ Wi-Fi. 
A.  Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets are a new economic tool that allow thousands 
of individuals on the Internet to express their opinions within a market 
setting.209 By letting people put ―their money where their mouth is,‖ 
prediction markets encourage thousands of people to join together in 
cyberspace to predict future events.  In other writing I have described how 
prediction markets operate, as well the opportunities and challenges posed 
by them in more depth.210
The short version is that prediction markets organize and aggregate 
individual knowledge into a collective result. 211  Each individual who is a 
trader in the information market acts to maximize his or her own reward.  
At the same time, the organizers of the market collectivize the results and 
harvest the valuable information that market participants have generated.  
The theory behind information markets is loosely related to the semi-
strong version of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which holds 
that, in a properly functioning capital market, the prices of securities will 
reflect all relevant publicly available information. 212  To put it another 
way, most markets contain a ―price discovery‖ function, aggregating 
information and predictions into the current price of that security. 213  In 
traditional capital markets, however,  the information-seeking aspects are, 
to a certain degree, by-products of trading and raising capital.  In 
contrast,  this information-seeking is the sole reason for the information 
market‘s existence.       
One of the most well-known prediction markets is the Iowa Electronic 
Markets (―IEM‖).214  The IEM, started in 1988 by academics at the 
University of Iowa Business School, has been operating since that time to 
predict the outcomes of various elections. 215  Any individual participant is 
209 See MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY (Yale University Press 2008). 
210 See Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information Markets to 
Predict Supreme Court Decisions,  100 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1141 (2006); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert 
L. Rogers,  Prediction Markets and the First Amendment,  2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (2008); Miriam A. Cherry 
& Robert L. Rogers,  Markets for Markets: Origins and Subjects of Information Markets,  58 RUTGERS L. REV. 
339 (2006). 
211 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xiv, 3-4 (2004).
212 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,  25 J. FIN. 383, 
383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,  70 VA. L. REV. 
549, 552-53 (1984).
213 See generally Michael T. Chng, A Model of Price Discovery and Market Design: Theory and 
Empirical Theory,  24 J.  OF FUTURE MARKETS 1107, 1108-10 (2004) (describing price discovery function 
performed by derivatives markets).
214 See, e.g. ,  Jordan Erin, Iowa Electronic Markets Yield Near-Accurate Result,  DES MOINES REG., Nov. 
10, 2004, at B5, available at 2004 WL 90800910. The IEM trades at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/.
215 Joyce Berg, et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research 1 (Nov. 2000)  
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/BFNR_2000.pdf [hereinafter Berg, et al., Results] The IEM has also 
expanded into predictions further afield from its base of political predictions.  Id.  at 7 n.10; Jordan Erin, U of I 
Markets Tapped to Predict Flu Activity,  DES MOINES REG., Nov. 22, 2004, at B1, available at 2004 WL 
100489665.
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limited to a $500 investment, so although the financial stake of any one 
person in the outcome is modest, each still has a financial incentive for 
making a correct prediction.216 Other similar political prediction  markets 
have appeared to predict the outcome of elections in Austria, 217 Germany,
218 and Canada.219  In previous work I detail the origins of various 
prediction markets and classify the areas in which they are operating.220
At the same time that prediction markets started to become more 
common, the legal regime surrounding ―real‖ money markets became 
more chilly.  In 2006, an online gambling ban enacted in the United States 
had a devastating effect on the growth of publicly available prediction 
markets.221  Although a prediction markets are not the same as, say, 
betting in a horse race,  that is,  the prediction market seeks information 
above and beyond allocation between players,  the law was written so 
broadly that prediction markets were swept into its coverage.  Despite 
some argument on the part of the author that prediction markets involved 
speech and expressive conduct, the gambling ban has meant that the 
majority of publicly available prediction markets have either been forced 
into using play money or have taken their operations overseas. 222
 Ultimately, the regulatory ban on using money in prediction 
markets effectively frustrated the development of an important 
information-gathering technology.  The larger point, which I will return to 
in Section VI, is that commodification in and of itself is not necessarily 
―bad‖ when it comes to a developing technology.  In fact, 
commodification can be quite beneficial at times, especially when it 
functions to incentivize participants to reveal information, predictions, and 
knowledge that could benefit others.  While some commodification 
situations cry out for more regulation, perhaps because of the desperation 
of those engaged in them, or some idea of exploitation, those elements 
could not be further from the type of useful predictive activity present in 
an information market.  As such, regulation of commodification should be 
fully analyzed before being imposed – especially when the technology 
here was not even truly the subject of the regulation.  With that lesson, I 
turn to see how access to legal and government materials has been 
commodified, somewhat in defiance of the notion that these materials 
should be publicly available to all citizens.  Recent developments are 
somewhat encouraging that access to information may be more 
216 See Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa 
Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange,  28 J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2003).
217Austrian Political Stock Markets, Austrian Electronic Markets,  http://ww.imw.tuwien.ac.at/apsm
(information markets predicting outcomes of Austrian elections). 
218 WAHLSTREET, http://www.wahlstreet.de (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (information market predicting 
outcomes of German elections). 
219 ELECTION STOCK MARKET, http://esm.ubc.ca (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (information market 
predicting outcomes of Canadian elections).  
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forthcoming – but this area is also not without its dispute.  
B.  The Monetization of Legal Research and an Online Clearinghouse for 
Legal Academia 
In a common-law, precedent-based system such as the one we have in 
the United States, the strength of a legal argument rests, in large part, on 
how other courts have resolved the same or similar issues.  Such a system 
leads to consistency of results, and with consistency comes stability.  In 
other words, the system depends on making arguments from precedent.   
Therefore, access to justice largely rests on having access to earlier 
decided cases.  Local governments, states, and the federal government, 
however, have been slow to make materials accessible, even though the 
justice system is supported by taxpayers.  While some law libraries 
feature open access to the public, others are privately run.  But access to a 
law library does not necessarily guarantee up to date legal research.  
Among print resources, it is difficult and time-consuming to check to see 
if a particular case has been overruled or otherwise called into question.  
Without any ability to use computerized searching, and given the sheer 
volume of what one person might need to sift through, the quest for cases 
in print format can be difficult and time-consuming.223
As far as online resources, for years this gap in access has been filled 
by for-profit companies.  Various CDs with legal information are 
available for purchase from a variety of vendors.   For the most part, 
however,  the need for computerized research has been filled by two for-
profit companies, Westlaw224 and Lexis. 225  For years, these two providers 
have featured searchable databases in which users could enter Boolean 
searches to find applicable caselaw, statutes, law review articles, and 
newspaper articles.  Further, users of both these databases could perform 
an automated check to see what other cases had cited any case they were 
examining, and to see, ultimately, if any particular case was overruled or 
otherwise had its authority called into question.  These commercialized 
databases were problematic for access, however, in that they have 
historically charged a substantial sum for their services. 226  As more and 
more other services migrated online, both Lexis and Westlaw moved to a 
world wide web model, which meant that its users could access the 
service whether researching from work, from the library, at home, or 
elsewhere.  Still,  the service remained expensive and there were few 
competitors to challenge the market domination of Westlaw and Lexis.  
Paradoxically, access to materials written by judges and legislators – all of 
which was meant to be open to the public – was made proprietary and 
223 See Michael W. Carroll, The Movement for Open Access Law,  10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 742-3 
(2006) (describing difficulty of finding materials before computerized access to legal materials). 
224 WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).  
225 LEXISNEXIS, www.lexis.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).  
226 Ashlee Vance, Legal Sites Plan Revamps as Rivals Undercut Price,  N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/technology/25westlaw.html?scp= 1&sq= westlaw%20vs.%20lexis&st= cs
e (discussing online legal database pricing); Ashby Jones, Can Bloomberg Compete with Westlaw and 
LexisNexis? LAW BLOG, WALL ST. J.,  July 8, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/07/08/can-bloomberg-law-
compete-with-westlaw-and-lexisnexis/ (same).
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commercialized simply because Westlaw and Lexis allowed users to 
search effectively and conveniently.   
The same access problem is also present with academic legal research.  
In the field of legal studies, law review articles and other legal academic 
writing has historically been difficult for the public to access freely. 227
Most law schools publish a law review, and in some instances schools also 
publish secondary journals specializing in a particular type of legal 
scholarship.  Historically, law reviews were only available to those that 
had a subscription, with the result that law libraries were one of the few 
places these materials were available.  As technology developed, Westlaw 
and Lexis placed law review articles online.  While legal academics and 
law students worked for free to write and edit these articles, these online 
databases charged their subscribers for access to these works.   Not only 
are these databases expensive, but between the time the author submitted 
their work to the law review, and then the time when the article actually 
would be available on the electronic database, often a year or more would 
pass.   
More recently, many law reviews began making published articles 
available for free on their websites.  While this was a significant step 
toward more accessibility, there is no centralized aggregating or indexing 
service that allows for search across different law review websites.  
Likewise, law journals only post the final versions of articles, meaning 
that there continues to be a significant time lag between when an article is 
given to the law review editors and when it becomes available to the 
public. 
Enter the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), which touted its 
website228 as a free platform for housing academic research in the social 
sciences.   The SSRN website is a platform that allows registered users to 
post drafts of their articles to the Internet. 229  Although SSRN does not 
allow for content searching in the same way as commercial database like 
Westlaw or Lexis, it has the advantage of making an author‘s work almost 
immediately available.  In addition, it is a free service, which is a huge 
assistance to those who are searching for legal knowledge but do not have 
access to expensive databases.   This was such an advantage that many 
thought of SSRN as cutting edge – a new and revolutionary ―open access‖ 
way of thinking about legal and social science scholarship.  Legal 
academics were able to point others to their work quickly and for free, 
expanding their readership and the audience for their ideas. 230
Quickly, however, concerns among academics began to emerge.  Even 
though SSRN had acted in many ways like an open access non-profit and 
was run by prominent academics, actually the website is owned by a for-
profit corporation.231  Many academics found out about the for-profit 
227 See Dan Hunter, Walled Gardens,  62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 613 (2005) (describing difficulty 
accessing materials and calling on law review publishing to become more open access).  
228 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (SSRN) HOME PAGE, http://www.ssrn.com (last visited Mar. 
4, 2012). 
229 Hunter, supra note 233, at 626. 
230 Id. 
231 Matthew Bodie, An Interview with SSRN’s Gregg Gordon,  PRAWFSBLAWG, June 15, 2006, available at
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/06/an_interview_wi.html (questioning SSRN‘s commitment 
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nature of SSRN in surprising ways.  First,  there was a false alarm that 
SSRN was going to charge for access to papers.  However, it was then 
learned that SSRN would not charge for internet viewing, but would be 
selling bound hard copies of papers to those who wanted such a 
printout.232  Later, users of the website began to see advertisements on the 
sides of the screen that were tied to the topics of the papers that were 
being searched.  Further, any article that was posted on SSRN received an 
SSRN watermark down the middle of the page as a form of advertising. 233
Throughout all of these efforts, SSRN has been testing ways to 
commercialize its website, but the professors who were posting papers did 
not necessarily realize that this work that they were posting was in the 
process of being commercialized by others.  
As Professor James Grimmelmann noted, in describing the reasons 
that he was choosing to post his research papers elsewhere: 
[i]f you make your money by selling subscriptions, then it 
makes institutional sense to place your own advertising on 
the goods. Never mind what these decisions do to open 
access to scholarship. That‘s no longer the point.  SSRN 
is a for-profit corporation. It‘s not yet (I think) a money-
making corporation, but its goal is to make money for its 
owners. It has chosen to do so by providing useful open-
access services to scholars, but when push comes to 
shove, the bottom line comes before the open access part.  
We don‘t need to blame SSRN or find fault with it.  It‘s
just doing what comes naturally—making the decision that 
[it has] supplied sufficient open access to fit into a market 
niche and declaring that good enough.234
In other words, whether a website promotes an open access ethic or is a 
commercialized venture is an important norm.  When operators of 
platforms and users are not in agreement about what those norms should 
be, disputes arise.  While at first SSRN seemed to promise a revolution in 
open access that might make a very real difference in the status quo of 
legal research, the question is whether it will dedicate itself to that mission 
in the future.  Will the owners of SSRN succumb to moral hazard?  SSRN 
may be poised for the same type of dispute between owners and users that 
rocked the Huffington Post.  
C.  “Free” Wi-Fi 
to open access scholarship given the for-profit nature of their business). 
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Another area of contest and dispute about monetization concerns the 
provision of Wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi).  Wi-Fi is an almost ubiquitous 
recent phenomenon, allowing Internet access in public settings, such as 
coffee shops, restaurants, hotels, or airports.  At the end of the 1990s, 
small, independent, local businesses tended to provide free Internet 
service and chains and large businesses tended to charge customers for 
access.  However,  within the last year or so, the market has undergone a 
paradigm shift, with large chains now offering free Wi-Fi.   Meanwhile, 
small businesses, perhaps because of the challenging economic 
environment during the recession, have started charging for their Wi-Fi 
services.  
 Wi-Fi, which had existed on some university campuses, started to 
see more widespread adoption around the turn of the century.235  Among 
one of the first commercial users of this new technology was Starbucks 
Coffee, which announced at the beginning of 2001 that they would begin 
rolling out Wi-Fi access across the United States in a partnership with 
MobileStar.236  The results were incredible: by the end of the year, over five 
hundred Starbucks had installed Wi-Fi and had high transmission speeds.237
Access to Starbucks‘ network did not come cheaply, however.  Users could 
choose between $15.95 a month for unlimited access, or use a pay-as-you-
go plan which cost ―about $3 for 15 minutes.‖238  However, only ten months 
after the announced partnership with Starbucks, MobileStar went out of 
business, and at least one analyst speculated that the high cost of its pricing 
structure was to blame.239  Quickly, other Wi-Fi providers moved into the 
market, and some began offering free access—perhaps most noticeably a 
non-profit which provided free Wi-Fi to areas in New York City.240
 By 2003, news accounts noted that Wi-Fi access in commercial 
space had increased to include the now-defunct Borders Books and 
McDonalds, smaller retailers and some locations in Europe.241  Pricing 
structure was in a state of flux, likely due to the new players entering the 
market.  While retailers like Starbucks still charged access fees, McDonalds 
and retailers like it provided an hour of free access with the purchase of 
certain meals.242  Other providers also sought to enter the market and 
provide Wi-Fi access to consumers for free, hoping to monetize access to 
these users by selling advertisements.243  At least some of these providers 
saw themselves in direct competition with the older market participants, like 
235 Vikas Bajaj, Thursday Starbucks brews plan for wireless; Shops to offer fast Net service from 
Richardson' s MobileStar, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 4, 2001, at 1D. 
236 Id.   MobileStar had been responsible for Wi-Fi access at 130 airports.  
237 Michelle Megna, Wireless at Starbucks,  DAILY NEWS, Aug. 16, 2001, at 12.  
238 Id.
239 Mark Kellner, MobileStar killed by its own greed,  WASHINGTON TIMES, OCT. 15, 2001, at D6. 
240 Michelle Megna, Wireless Areas around the City Let you Access the Internet for Free,  DAILY NEWS 
(NEW YORK), Oct. 21, 2001, at 6.  
241 David Akin, Do you want Wi-Fi to go with those fries?,  GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 12, 2003, at B5. 
242 Id. 
243 Rob Wright, Wireless For Free -- Solution Provider Invents an Innovative Marketing Approach, 
VARBUSINESS, May 26, 2003, at 62.  
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Starbucks.244  The approach seemed to be working, and by mid 2003, both 
the technology and finance sectors had doubts about the ability to capitalize 
Wi-Fi hotspots, some cautioning that the industry would do well to 
remember the pitfalls of the then recent dot-com crash.245
 It seemed the tipping point for free Wi-Fi access arrived in 2004.  
News media continued to publish stories highlighting the increasing 
proliferation of Wi-Fi networks, while simultaneously casting doubts that 
models requiring payment for access were sustainable.246  The media 
portrayed the payment model as facing stiff competition from those 
providing free Wi-Fi, both intentionally247 and accidently.248   Small 
businesseses proclaimed they would use free Wi-Fi access as a loss-leader 
to draw in business—sometimes evoking Starbucks directly in 
comparison.249  However, by 2005 a report by JiWire, Inc seemed to 
dampen those projections, noting that of the 34,544 Wi-Fi hotspots listed, 
only 10% were free, while Starbucks maintained 5,770 hotspots, and 
McDonalds nearly 12,000.250
 The competition between price structures has not yet subsided—
despite the frequent shifting in the market, both in terms of who the 
providers are and what share of the market they captured.  In 2008, one of 
the largest providers of Wi-Fi access, AT&T, moved to allow free unlimited 
access at any of its hotspots—provided the customer purchased home high 
speed Internet first.251  Shortly thereafter, AT&T partnered with Starbucks 
to service their Wi-Fi, and offered two free hours of access, then a first for 
Starbucks.252  However, this move did not prevent small local coffee shops, 
large chains like Panera, and even fast food restaurants like Schlotzky‘s 
Deli from providing free Wi-Fi access as an attempt to drive visitors from 
Starbucks.253  Interestingly, soon after partnering with AT&T, Starbucks 
announced they would attempt to fuse both price structures by granting 
limited free access to customers who used a loyalty card at least once per 
month.254  USA Today noted that Starbucks rolled the program out during 
―the worst slump in its history‖ and likely did so in an attempt to draw 
244 Id.
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247 Crayton Harrison, Wi-Fi for Free You get a Place to Surf; Shops Get a Loyal Clientele,  DALLAS 
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251 AT&T's Broadband Customers Get Unlimited Wi-Fi,  TECHWEB, Jan. 23, 2008. 
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customers and profits.255
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that independent coffee shop owners, 
at least those in New York City, are starting to reverse course and remove 
free Wi-Fi due to a tightening economy and increased costs.256  Further 
evidence suggests smaller owners do not see their customer base becoming 
disillusioned with these developments—seemingly believing that 
movements that focus on locality and small businesses will keep their 
customers spending.257  It seems their theory will soon be put to the test 
since in 2010, Starbucks announced it would be removing all pay 
mechanisms from its Wi-Fi access and would be allowing unrestricted free 
access.258
Despite nearly ten years of technological development and 
consumer demand, there is still no clear consensus on Wi-Fi pricing 
structure.  While it would seem that customers would vastly prefer free Wi-
Fi rather than have it tacked on as an extra charge of staying in a hotel 
room, for example, consumers are apparently willing to pay for Wi-Fi as a 
matter of convenience.  Despite being a pioneer of commercial Wi-Fi 
application, Starbucks resisted the movement to free Wi-Fi until last year, 
when  it suddenly reversed its policy.  Meanwhile, small businesses seem to 
now be eschewing free Wi-Fi in the hopes of lowering their costs, hoping 
that their supporters will stay loyal anyway.  As to how this impacts 
consumer expectations, consumers may not be sure what the pricing 
structure will be, and where will receive free access.259
 Whether it is the expectations of bloggers, the question of whether 
predictions about the future can be monetized, or how access to legal 
research materials should be apportioned, the same questions of 
commodification and conflicting expectations run throughout all of these 
examples.  We have seen that commodification is not necessarily bad – in 
virtual work, in fact, it may be a necessity to ensure that workers receive 
a living wage, and in prediction markets, money is an effective motivator 
for gathering data.  However,  disputes tend to occur when one group 
comes to a contractual relationship believing that they are participating in 
a non-commodified website, when really the creators of the website may 
have something commodified in mind.  From these lessons, we turn next 
to the larger doctrinal and theoretical implications of cyber 
255 Bruce Horovitz,  Starbucks'  New Flavor: Free Wi-Fi; Chain Hopes to Perk up Traffic, USA TODAY, 
Jun. 3, 2008, at 8.  Interestingly, less than a month after the free AT&T Wi-Fi program, T-Mobile, Starbucks‘ 
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2008. 
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commodification. 
VI.  The Implications of Cyber Commodification 
 To this point, this Article has focused on elaborating various facets 
of the concept of cyber commodification.  How cyber commodification 
differs from other forms; the forces propelling cyber commodification; the 
process by which it takes place; and the contests that have arisen over this 
topic.  In each of these sections, I have endeavored to provide examples 
of how different aspects of monetization or non-monetization – predicting 
it,  policing it,  advocating for one situation or another – has been fairly 
confounding.  In this section, I want to extrapolate several larger 
theoretical points that can be drawn from the examples that I have spun 
out.   
First,  it is of note that the issues surrounding cyber 
commodification are similar in some respects to the debate in intellectual 
property law about creating proper incentives for creators by protecting IP 
rights, while at the same time allowing for experimentation, parody, fair 
use, and open access.  This central conflict is played out in many of the 
debates over open access material versus the drive to copyright. 260  Similar 
argumentative tropes might be analogous in the context of cyber 
commodification as well.  The problem, however, is slightly different as 
the value generated from various collaborative activities comes from the 
wisdom of the crowd, and the aggregation of talents and opinions, rather 
than the work of an individual creator seeking intellectual property 
protection for an personal invention.  
Second, rather than looking at the issue in cold or impersonal 
market rhetoric,  it is important to recognize commodification as a more 
human sociological issue.  As noted by Viviana Zelizer in The Social 
Meaning of Money,  ―[w]hile money does serve as a key rational tool of 
the modern economic market, it also exists outside the sphere of the 
market and is profoundly influenced by cultural and social structures.‖ 261
In her book, Collateral Knowledge,  Professor Annelise Riles provides 
further anthropological insights into the social construction of markets. 262
Riles argues persuasively that market components, such as the notion of 
collateral, may function as substitutes for personal knowledge of the 
counterparty to a transaction or elaborate dispute resolution 
mechanisms.263  These insights are important to understanding another 
point raised by Professor Zelizer: 
Clearly, a link is missing in the traditional approach to 
money.  Impressed by the fungible, impersonal 
260 See, e.g.  Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 917, 921 (2005); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment,  95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010). 
261 VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 18 (1994). 
262 ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
54-55 (2011). 
263 Id. 
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characteristics of money, classic theorists emphasized its 
instrumental rationality and apparently unlimited capacity 
to transform products, relationships, and sometimes even 
emotions into an abstract and objective numerical 
equivalent.  But money is neither culturally neutral nor 
socially anonymous.  It may well ―corrupt‖ values and 
convert social ties into numbers, but values and social 
relations reciprocally transmute money by investing it 
with meaning and social patterns.264
In other words, some of the cyber-exchanges that I have been discussing 
at various points in the Article may help us make sense of the larger web 
of collaborative knowledge that better communication and technology 
have made possible.  With these observations, I want to turn now to 
examine some thoughts about cyber commodification, first on the 
doctrinal level of contract law and then on a broader macro level.   
A. Doctrinal Implications of Cyber Commodification for Contract Law 
As for some of the legal disputes about commodification raised in 
earlier parts of the paper, we may want to look to well-known doctrines of 
contract law to help us resolve many of these questions.  So, in an earlier 
part of the paper, I discussed the fact that there are some services, such as 
mapping programs and social networking that may allow users free 
access, but then dictate particular terms of use through adhesive end user 
license agreements that no one reads.  Also, there are situations, such as 
the Huffington Post bloggers example, where clashing notions of whether 
the relationship was or should be commodified have caused conflict.  
Some virtual activity is obviously paid work, but other types blur the lines 
between work and leisure.  This permeable boundary leads to disputes.   
The traditional doctrines of contract law may be useful in 
analyzing these varied situations.  The ancient doctrine of consideration, 
which I alluded to previously, may provide one mode of analysis.  We 
would ask here whether a bargained-for-exchange exists between websites 
and users.  In many instances, a website might be providing users with 
valuable services, but they may not receive anything directly in return 
from the users.  In a peer production model in which the user does not 
pay to use the platform, it might at first seem that there is no 
consideration and therefore no binding contract.   On the other hand, in a 
peer production model, the website is gaining control, in many instances, 
of the content that a person is posting,  and that content is extremely 
valuable, since it serves to build the value of the site, and to attract other 
users.  The power of many of these websites comes from the crowd, and 
the ability to attract others to use the service.  Further, if a website is 
gathering information about its users so that it can have information for 
advertisers or use that information in other ways, that might qualify as 
264 ZELIZER, supra note 267, at 18. 
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receiving something tangibly valuable for consideration purposes under 
existing caselaw. 265
Other contractual rubrics may also be helpful for resolving 
disputes.  One such possibility would be the doctrine of good faith and 
fair dealing; another would be unjust enrichment.   While not strictly 
contractual, unjust enrichment theories focus on a quantum meruit or 
restitutionary measure of recovery when one party has unjustly enriched 
another, and no contract is present. 266  The doctrine recognizes that 
technically assent is missing, and that contractual bargaining has been 
defective, but nonetheless, unfairness has occurred and one party has been 
enriched.267  In other words, many cases in this area discuss the 
―hypothetical bargain‖ model, i.e. what would the parties have decided if 
they could turn back time and we could assume that they behaved in a 
rational way toward each other?  Even though the bloggers lost this 
argument at the trial court level, one assumes that the founders of the 
Huffington Post would have rather had the content from the bloggers, 
even if they would (retroactively) have to consider paying them, and that 
the bloggers may well have assented under those circumstances.  
Further, a question that will be increasingly important to ask is how to 
facilitate drawing the distinction between those who are participating in 
crowdsourcing websites or other virtual work for fun and in some unpaid 
capacity even though some of their services might be paid in another 
context (such as editing in Wikipedia) and those who are opting to work in 
the market economy and thus arguably should receive the traditional legal 
protections for employment activity (clickworkers clicking away on 
Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk).  As it currently stands, this distinction is 
notoriously difficult to draw. 268
One solution would be to leave the issue in the regime of voluntary,  
contractual private ordering.  If the majority of users participate just for 
fun, that might weigh in favor of the default rule being no regulation, with 
an opt-in to the protections of labor and employment law. On the other 
hand, one could argue that the default rule should be protection, and then 
users must deliberately and unequivocally state they are volunteers, 
acknowledge that they will not receive monetary payment, and clearly opt 
out.  In my view, the later approach – requiring an extremely clear opt 
out – is the better approach.  Considering the differential bargaining 
power often at issue in employment situations – which is why certain legal 
protections exist – it may make more sense to create a default rule of 
265 Dahl v. Hem Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (1993) (holding that information gathered in a 
clinical drug trial could constitute consideration necessary to finding of a contractual relationship, in case where 
a pharmaceutical company promised study participants free drug treatment in exchange for participation, later 
reneging on promise by arguing that provision of the medicine was only gratuitous).  
266 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 1 cmt. B (Discussion Draft 
2000) (―Unjustified enrichment is enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis: it results from a transfer that 
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& GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 13 (Gareth Jones, ed., 6th ed. 2007) (noting that unjust 
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regulation, with clear assent needed in order to disclaim the protections.   
Of course, this runs the risk of making the opt-out process potentially 
burdensome for those looking for fun and not looking to be bogged down 
with legalities.  One way to deal with the opt-out would be to include it in 
the form clickwrap agreements that users must necessarily agree to in 
order to use many websites, receive free downloads, or order products. 269
This is the format that many businesses currently use on websites, and it 
would, at the very least, provide some sort of notice as to what type of 
legal category / relationship the user was entering.          
This is merely one suggestion, however, and it is far from perfect.  
First,  our minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)270 is 
an immutable default rule – normally it cannot be waived.  After all,  if 
employers and employees could ―opt out‖ of the minimum wage, that 
would undercut its very existence.  Companies might choose to exploit 
such an exemption opportunistically, not just to apply to those who 
participate as volunteers and for entertainment.  Using Facebook to get 
back in touch with old friends could be a ―hobby,‖ but getting users to do 
work on translating portions of the website looks more like the traditional 
―work‖ that one would assume the company‘s employees would typically 
handle.      
As I have noted before in previous work, there are serious critiques of 
clickwrap licenses themselves. 271 Clickwrap ―agreements‖ are 
problematic because they incorporate some of the worst characteristics of 
adhesion contracts, allowing for ―acceptance‖ or ―rejection‖ of the terms 
as a whole only on a take it or leave it basis with no negotiation on behalf 
of the user. 272  Some of the boilerplate terms contained in online 
agreements is so harsh or one-sided that it would likely be held 
unenforceable.273  In ―browsewrap‖ contracts, certain contractual 
provisions are found only by visiting another portion of the website. 274
Courts have hesitated to enforce browsewraps because of the very real 
problem of lack of assent – if the user was not on notice that these terms 
even existed, it is difficult to think of them as being part of a voluntary 
contract. 275 Further, given worker‘s lack of knowledge of basic rights 
governing the employment relationship,276 it is problematic to assume that 
workers will understand the legalese associated with a clickwrap or 
browsewrap. 
269 See, e.g.  Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic 
Age,  77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002).  
270 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. Sections 
201-19 (2006)). 
271 See Miriam A. Cherry, Working For (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards 
Act in Cyberspace,  60 ALA. L. REV. 1077 (2009).  
272 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Esay in Reconstruction,  96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) 
(providing summary of adhesion contracts concepts).  
273 See, e.g.  Shmeul I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in 
the Age of Online User Participation,  14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 303 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, 
Terms of Use,  91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006); Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum 
Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts,  42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041 (2005).
274 See, e.g.  Specht, et al v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 585 (SDNY 2001) 
(discussing various forms of online contracting).  
275 Id. 
276 Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal 
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997).  
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Given the existing problems with online contracting, what other 
models might we look to for answers?  As I have noted in previous 
writing, there are several factors that should be given a prominent role in 
any determination of whether online activity is ―work‖ and subject to 
regulation under FLSA.277  Is such activity being monetized and 
commodified?  If that is case, perhaps commodification is an indication 
that the activity should properly be classified as paid work.  Another 
factor might be whether the work is ―de-skilled‖ work.  In such 
situations, the potential for exploitation might be higher, and thus the 
protections of the FLSA might be more important.  
Finally, since the Department of Labor may choose to regulate this 
activity in the near future, it might make sense for private employers that 
are experimenting with this type of work – and the websites that facilitate 
them – to attempt a self-regulatory response in order to frame the dialogue 
if in fact an extension of the FLSA is proposed, which seems likely.   One 
such response might be to construct a code of ―best practices‖ for 
cyberwork that attempted to draw some of the lines between work and 
entertainment activity, and set out some guidelines that would prevent the 
more extreme forms of exploitation.  These ―best practices‖ would be 
influential if they formed a coherent set of expectations which both 
workers and employers could adhere.  If such a voluntary response is 
present, the line-drawing exercise necessitated by the FLSA may not be as 
difficult as it might first appear.   
B. Theoretical Implications of Cyber Commodification 
From these practical solutions, I now turn to a more theoretical 
discussion of cyber commodification.  It is important to note that cyber 
commodification has become a controversial area because group 
knowledge has particular characteristics that make it unique.  After all,  
what do crowdsourcing,  crowdfunding, prediction markets, and wikipedia 
all have in common?  They all rely on, indeed could not exist without, the 
contributions of a large group of members.  That is what is so interesting 
about these new businesses, the ones that harness the Internet successfully  
in a multitude of ways.    What is common between prediction markets and 
crowdsourcing is that both acknowledge that large groups, when properly 
harnessed, can result in better outcomes than the efforts of individuals. 278
These various websites,  programs, and crowdsourcing tools are 
only valuable because of their scale. 279  For example, Facebook is at its 
most useful when a person attains a critical mass of friends or 
acquaintances who are also using it.   If a person has zero Facebook 
friends, being on Facebook will not be enjoyable, since here will be no 
277 Miriam A. Cherry, Working For (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in 
Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077 (2009).  
278 See Abramowicz, supra note 208; Suroweicki, supra note 209; Cass Sunstein, Infotopia,  supra note 
70. 
279 See Teppo Felin & Todd R. Zenjer, Information Aggregation, Matching and Radical Market Hybrids: 
Implications for the Theory of the Firm,  9 STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION 163 (2011) (noting that both 
crowdsourcing websites and prediction markets harness the power of the crowd, and also perform information 
aggregating and matching functions).  
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one to read or ―like‖ any posts.  In other words, the intrinsic value of the 
Facebook site to the individual person depends on how many others in 
their social circle are also using it.   And the connections, the fun part of 
being on Facebook also generate value for the company itself, which can 
brag to advertisers about the number of connections generated and the 
captive eyeballs on its platform.  Like Facebook, so too wikipedia, 
craigslist, Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk, and countless other websites that 
are either commercial, or not.  They depend on vast numbers of eyeballs 
and users – in other words, harnessing the collective knowledge, skills, 
and time.   
In examining these questions, I am largely interested in two legal 
theorists, Professors Margaret Jane Radin and Yochai Benkler, whose 
work informs and provides structure for the present context.  Professor 
Radin introduced and developed the theory of commodification in legal 
studies in a series of pathbreaking works concerning the commodification 
of the body and sexuality.  For some years, Professor Benkler has been 
writing about open source computing and how networked peer production 
would seem to provide a ―third way‖ of non-commodified production, 
apart from either markets or the firm, to borrow the terminology from 
Coase‘s theory of the firm.    
In Contested Commodities,  Professor Radin is concerned with how 
commodification interacts and perhaps subtracts from what she terms the 
conception of personhood.280  Aside from the theoretical concept of 
commodification, which she explores in depth, she is also concerned with 
subordination, objectificiation, and the inequitable distribution of wealth 
within society.  In fact,  one question she raises is whether these other ills 
are the real concern, not commodification itself. 281  Radin does not 
espouse either one of these dualities precisely, and she mostly 
concentrates on commodification as it interacts with the sale of the body 
and related elements.  As such, she focuses not so much on the dichotomy 
between commodification and non-commodification, but with the concept 
of human flourishing.   
Although Radin declares that she does not believe in setting up a 
binary opposition between ―universal commodification‖ and complete 
―non-commodification,‖ she hints at various points throughout the book 
that commodification is dangerous.   Although Professor Radin formally 
claims that she believes in discourse pluralism, the more examples she 
provides, the more the reader becomes convinced that commodification is 
a problem.  In her view, we are on a slippery slope of commodification 
that will chip away at our dignity, and ultimately our personhood as we 
slip our way down the slope.  This is despite the fact that much of 
―woman‘s work‖ has been undervalued precisely because it is outside the 
realm of the marketplace.  
In his book, The Wealth of Networks and an accompanying law 
review article, 282 Professor Yochai Benkler focuses on the potential for 
280 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 154 (1996). 
281 Id.  at 155. 
282 Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm,  112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); 
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collaborative work in cyberspace. 283  Both in the book and an 
accompanying law review article,  Professor Benkler regales the reader 
with rich descriptions of the Linux operating system, wikipedia, Project 
Guttenberg, and the NASA Mars project.  In all of these online 
endeavors,  users coordinate their efforts through collaboration by using 
small segments of their time, talents, or computing power.  In Benkler‘s 
vision, this ―peer production‖ model presents another option for economic 
coordination (in addition to Coase‘s description of markets and firms) 
when certain conditions are met.  Throughout both the book and the law 
review article, it is no secret that Professor Benkler strongly advocates for 
the importance of the peer production model.  According to Professor 
Benkler, money does not (and moreover should not) play into the 
motivations of the participants.  Rather, he claims, users are motivated by 
intellectual joy, pride, excellence, giving back to the community, and 
other similar non-monetary interests.  While Professor Benkler mostly 
assumes that the users‘ interests and those of the creators match, he does 
occasionally allude to the idea of moral hazard.    
In Professor Benkler‘s view, peer production stands the best 
chance of succeeding when the model is able to take into account the 
differing interests, talents, and capabilities of the users.  Projects that 
allow for users to harness their talents and match them with available 
tasks, Benkler suggests, will be the most efficient for the peer production 
model.  Benkler identifies two additional critieria for successful peer 
production: granularity, which will allow for only a small task and a small 
commitment of time or effort,  and, second, modularity, which allows for 
those discrete elements to be both successfully broken down and then later 
integrated into the larger project.  While Professors Radin and Benkler 
approach the problem quite differently – Radin from a feminist 
perspective,  Benkler from an open source advocacy perspective – both 
seem to view commodification with suspicion.   
No theory to date explains why harnessing collective knowledge in 
cyberspace results in the presence of Wikipedia, and simultaneously, 
prediction markets.  Both do aggregate knowledge, but one is explicitly 
free,  relying solely on the goodwill  of volunteer editors and a few 
donated dollars, while prediction markets are built around the central 
theme that money is the only element that matters.  How do we reconcile 
these conflicting models?  How do we recognize that bloggers may view 
their contributions differently in varying situations, and that they are 
unhappy when their expectations about monetization are not met by the 
blog‘s operators?
Overall, both Professors Radin and Benkler have made outstanding 
contributions to commodification theory but at the same time seem 
See also Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer Production,  11 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963 (2009).   
283 See, e.g.  YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 9 (2006) (―As collaboration among far-flung 
individuals becomes more common, the idea of doing things that require cooperation with others becomes much 
more attainable, and the range of projects individuals can choose as their own therefore qualitatively increases.  
The very fluidity and low commitment required of any given cooperative relationship increases the range and 
diversity of cooperative relations people can enter, and therefore of collaborative projects they can conceive of 
as open to them.‖).    
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skeptical of monetizing information on the Internet.  While I understand 
their suspicion, the world of cyber commodification is so diverse that a 
rule of absolute non-commodification would do at least some of these new 
forms of collaboration a disservice.  For example, payment is important in 
virtual work to prevent exploitation of workers,  especially disenfranchised 
ones in the Third World.  A norm of non-commodification does not take 
the rather unique status of these Third World workers into account.  
Money also may help us attain more accurate results in prediction 
markets.      
What is it that markets do that perhaps other forms are not able to 
do?  Markets, after all,  perform an allocative function as well as a 
coordination task.  A market orders and organizes what would otherwise 
be random activity.  Money might incentivize people to reveal their 
knowledge.  Further, a living wage for work performed is important.  
Contrary to what both Professors Radin and Benkler seem to advocate,  
money itself is not the problem in some of the scenarios set out in this 
Article.284  In fact, the lack of money for work on the Internet – especially 
when it concerns the meager wages paid to Third World workers in a 
crowdsourcing scheme – can smack more of exploitation than free 
collaboration. 
One way to look at this is as a coordination problem.  As we know 
from Coase‘s theory of the firm, both markets and firms are ways of 
efficiently organizing economic activity.  So what motivates people in a 
non-commodified crowdsourcing situation? The question of motivation is 
far more complicated than homos economius would have us believe. 285
There is a complicated series of motivations that drive any one person, 
including a mixture of altruism and of self-interest.   Further,  while certain 
tasks might be feely volunteered, other tasks are simply too boring, 
mundane, annoying, or time-intensive that people will not do them unless 
they are paid.  
Despite the warnings from Professors Benkler and Radin about 
commodification, there are certain areas where we should not be worried 
about monetization, but instead we should be worried about non-
monetization.  So failing to pay workers minimum wage online should not 
be praised as a new method of peer production – it should be viewed 
skeptical, in some instances even condemned in the even that it leads to 
exploitation.  Those who change the expectations of users halfway through 
a relationship due to moral hazard and the lure of money should not have 
their own expectations respected.  At the same time, participants in social 
entrepreneurship or a prediction market will likely benefit from having a 
monetary exchange as part of their freedom of expression.  There is no 
reason to fear these forms of exchanges just because they involve money.  
Returning to Professor Zelizer‘s point, money may influence society, but 
society influences money as well.  Perhaps through efforts such as social 
284 See Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-based Peer Production and Virtue,  14 J.  OF 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 394 (2006) (arguing that unpaid peer production is morally virtuous).  
285 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008); DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS 
TVERSKY, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (2000). 
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entrepreneurship, we can change the way we think about the very concept 
of monetization. 
Therefore, I would suggest that, unlike the Delaware Chancery 
Court, we do not have to choose between the wholly monetized model of 
eBay and the public-service world of craigslist.  Instead of imposing 
choices, dichotomies, and artificial categories to these new forms of 
collaboration and business organization, we should allow entrepreneurs, 
social or otherwise, the freedom to experiment, explore, and choose 
different models.  This means, however,  that websites should be free not 
only to implement a philanthropic or social business model, but also to use 
money to motivate their participants, such as in virtual work or within 
prediction markets.  But when doing so, we must keep in mind Professor 
Radin‘s particular admonition: will any particular activity in cyberspace 
add in total to the sum of human flourishing?    
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, our journey across the Internet shows us that 
cyberspace is currently in a state of incomplete commodification.286  The 
current landscape of cyberspace contains multiple regimes of 
commodified, non-commodified, and mixed-use settings.  This mixture –
which in many instances defies logic or common sense – tells us that there 
is no one natural ―state of nature‖ for the Internet.  If anything, the 
development of certain intermediate business models like social 
entrepreneurship can potentially reframe the ways that we look at the 
nature of markets and the theory of the firm.   
